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FULFILLING THE BARGAIN: HOW THE SCIENCE OF 
ERGONOMICS CAN INFORM THE lAWS OF 
WORKERS' COMPENSATION 
Jason M. Solomon 
In the last decade, cumulative trauma disorders have become a signifi-
cant percentage of reported workplace injuries and litigated workers' compen-
sation claims. Arising from the accumulated impact of daily work activities 
on the body, these injuries do not fall neatly within either the "accident" or 
"disease" categories which comprise workers' compensation laws. As a result, 
courts and legislatures have struggled to properly evaluate workers' compen-
sation claims for these injuries. This Note looks at the legal treatment of 
cumulative trauma injuries in light of the "original bargain" of workers' 
compensation, where workers give up a tort remedy against their employers in 
exchange for guaranteed, but limited, compensation for work-related injuries. 
In doing so, this Note undertakes a comprehensive comparison of litigated 
cumulative trauma cases in the tort and workers' compensation systems. Ul-
timately, this Note argues that judges must use the original bargain as an 
interpretative lens when deciding cumulative trauma cases, and points to 
ergonomics-the science of the workplace-as a significant new tool for de-
termining whether such injuries are work-related. 
INTRODUCTION 
It has been called the "the No. 1 occupational hazard of the 1990s"1 
and the "disease of the information age."2 The injury is known as cumu-
lative trauma disorder ( CTD), 3 or repetitive strain injury (RSI), and it 
became the fastest-growing occupational injury or disease by the end of 
1. Dramatic Rise in Repetitive Motion Injuries and OSHA's Response: Before the 
Subcomm. on Unemployment and Housing of the House Comm. on Government 
Operations, 101st Cong. 1 (1989) (opening statement of Tom Lantos, Chairman, House 
Comm. on Gov't Operations). 
2. David Anderson, RSI Can Strain the Bottom Line, Bus. & Health, Jan. 1, 1998, at 
44; see also Stephanie Armour, Young Tech Workers Face Crippling Injuries, USA Today, 
Feb. 9, 2001, at 1B (referring to some repetitive injuries as "Silicon Valley syndrome"). 
Though the increased attention to repetitive stress injuries may in part be the result of the 
spread of the affliction to white-collar workers, the injury itself has existed for years. Infra 
note 31. In fact, it tends to be most common among certain blue-collar workers such as 
meatpackers, nursing aides, truck drivers and grocery workers. Bureau of Labor Statistics, 
Lost-Worktime Injuries and lllnesses: Characteristics and Resulting Time Away from Work, 
1999, at 4-5 (2001) [hereinafter Lost-Worktime Injuries]. 
3. CTDs are commonly understood as injuries that can result from chronic and 
repeated stress of a muscle, tendon or nerve. Carpal tunnel syndrome is a common type of 
CTD. One commentator provides the following examples of workplace injuries that are 
generally characterized as CTDs: "a newspaper reporter's hand aches after many hours at 
a computer keyboard; a butcher experiences intense wrist pain while cutting meat; a 
housekeeper awakens in the middle of the night with numb fingers following a hard day of 
scrubbing floors." Allard E. Dembe, Occupation and Disease: How Social Factors Affect 
the Conception of Work-Related Disorders 24 ( 1996). 
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the twentieth century. CTDs now account for greater than 60% of all 
occupational illnesses in the United States, afflicting an estimated 1.8 mil-
lion American workers per year,4 and the annual compensable costs for 
these disorders is estimated to be $20 billion.5 Further, CTDs make up a 
significant portion of workers' compensation claims6 and tend to be the 
most frequently litigated of all workers' compensation claims, often lead-
ing to significant delays for the injured employee in receiving medical 
care.7 
Meanwhile, as workers' compensation claims for such injuries have 
grown, the business community and insurance industry have lobbied state 
legislatures to reduce the "burden" of such claims on employers and in-
surance companies. In turn, many state legislatures have amended work-
ers' compensation statutes to restrict the compensability of such claims-
acting to combat the perception of a spiraling "cost crisis" in the workers' 
compensation system.s 
The medical and legal literature often uses the terms "cumulative trauma disorder," 
"repetitive stress injury," and "work-related musculoskeletal disorder" interchangeably. 
This Note will primarily use "cumulative trauma disorder" or the acronym "CTD." 
4. Eve Tahmincioglu, Battling Job-Related Aches and Pains, N.Y. Times, Jan. 3, 2001, 
at Gl. 
5. Awwad]. Dababneh et al., Impact of Added Rest Breaks on the Productivity and 
Well Being ofWorkers, 44 Ergonomics 164, 164 (2001) (citing Bureau of Labor Statistics 
data). The Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) estimates that 
musculoskeletal disorders account for $1 out of every $3 in workers' compensation costs. 
Occupational Safety & Health Admin., U.S. Dep't of Labor, Ergonomics: The Study of 
Work 4 (2000), available at www.osha-slc.gov/Publications/Osha3125.pdf (last visited Mar. 
30, 2001). The high cost of such injuries is in part due to the fact that the average missed 
work days for CTDs far exceeds that for the average occupational illness or injury. See 
Lost-Worktime Injuries, supra note 2, at 4 ("Repetitive motion, such as grasping tools, 
scanning groceries, and typing, resulted in the longest absences from work among the. 
leading events and exposures ... .");Robin Herbert et al., Carpal Tunnel Syndrome and 
Workers' Compensation Among an Occupational Clinic Population in New York State, 35 
Am.]. Indus. Med. 335, 336 (1999) (citing a 1996 National Council on Compensation 
Insurance study of forty states that reported 2.5 times more missed work days on average 
for CTD claimants than for those with other illnesses and injuries). 
6. See Emily A. Spieler, Perpetuating Risk? Workers' Compensation and the 
Persistence of Occupational Injuries, 31 Hous. L. Rev. 119, 149 n.ll3 (1994) (citing a 
survey by one major insurer that showed that forty-five percent of claim payments were for 
CTDs). 
7. A recent study found that nearly 80% of workers' compensation claimants with 
carpal tunnel syndrome had their claim challenged by the insurance company or received 
no response at all. Herbert et al., supra note 5, at 340. Indeed, many challenged CTD 
claims take more than a year to resolve. Id. 
8. See Press Release, Nat' I Acad. of Soc. Ins., Academy Launches Review of Workers' 
Compensation: Research Initiative Will Track Medical Costs (May 5, 1997) (referring to 
the "confused and emotional national situation involving workers' benefits and employers' 
costs"), available at www.nasi.org/Press%20 Releases/Worker's%20Comp/wcpress.htm 
(last visited Mar. 30, 2001). As a percentage of covered payroll, both benefit payments and 
costs have declined sharply from the all-time highs during the 1990s: Benefits declined by 
35% from 1.66% to 1.08% of covered payroll between 1992 and 1998, while costs to 
employers declined by 38% from 2.17% to 1.35% of payroll between 1993 and 1998. See 
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While the number of reported cumulative trauma injuries has 
grown, a new and valuable discipline surrounding workplace design-
commonly known as "ergonomics"9-has become available to employers 
in order to prevent such injuries. Ergonomics encompasses such tradi-
tional "preventive" measures as employee education on proper posture, 
as well as more significant changes that include job rotation to minimize 
the risk of injury for repetitive motion, hiring more workers, and slowing 
down the rate of production. Several studies of ergonomics in individual 
workplaces show that ergonomic changes have increased worker produc-
tivity by up to 25%, and have reduced the cost of sick leave, staff turnover, 
and workers' compensation. 10 Since ergonomics was first introduced to 
industry, it has become a staple of occupational health and safety for 
Nat'l Acad. of Soc. Ins., Workers' Compensation: Benefits, Coverage, and Costs, 
1997-1998 New Estimates 1-2 (2000), available at http://www.nasi.org/workcomp/l997-
98Data/wc97-98rpt.htm (last visited Mar. 30, 2001) [hereinafter Nat'l Acad. of Soc. lns., 
1997-1998 Workers' Compensation]. This report also indicates that a tightening of 
eligibility for workers' compensation benefits was one of several likely factors behind this 
decline in costs. Id. at 30. 
9. Ergonomics, the new applied science for the workplace, is broadly defined as 
"[t]he science relating to man and his work." Stasior v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 19 
F.Supp. 2d 835, 847 (N.D. 111. 1998) (citing Dorland's Illustrated Medical Dictionary 574 
(W.B. Saunders Co., 28th ed. 1994)). 
10. See, e.g., Occupational Safety & Health Admin., U.S. Dep't of Labor, Ergo Success 
Stories: Saving Resources-Time, Money, Health (2000) available at www.osha-slc.gov/ 
ergonomics-standard/informationkit/successstories.pdf (last visited Mar. 30, 2001) 
(describing elements of ergonomics programs at several private-sector employers),; U.S. 
Gen. Accounting Office, Worker Protection: Private Sector Ergonomics Programs Yield 
Positive Results, Report# HEHS-97-163, (Aug. 1997) (same); Kenneth Bredemeier & Sarah 
Schafer, Firms Get a Grip on 'Repetitive' Injuries, Wash. Post, Mar. 18, 2001, at HI 
(noting the efforts of the supermarket chain Stop & Shop to redesign jobs based on 
employee feedback, and train workers on ways to prevent CTDs); Ctr. for Workplace 
Health Info., Big, Small Firms Show How Ergo Programs Make Cents, 5 CTD News 1 
(1996) (using annual "best practices" issue to describe the successful ergonomics efforts of 
a range of companies). 
Increasingly, unions are working with employers to implement such programs. See, 
e.g., Hendricks-Robinson v. Excel Corp., 154 F.3d 685, 688 n.4 (7th Cir. 1998) (describing 
a 1989 agreement between Excel and the United Food and Commercial Workers Union 
initiating an ergonomics program in Excel's meatpacking plant in Beardstown, Illinois); 
Paul S. Adler et al., Ergonomics, Employee Involvement, and the Toyota Production 
System: A Case Study of NUMMl's 1993 Model Introduction, 50 Indus. & Lab. Rei. Rev. 
416, 430-32 (1997) (assessing the role of the UAW as one factor that influenced 
ergonomic outcomes in the General Motors-Toyota joint venture in Fremont, California); 
N.Y. Comm. on Occupational Safety & Health, NYCOSH Update, Dec. 15, 2000 
(describing the success of the union UNITE! in bargaining for an ergonomics standard 
that would apply to 4,000 commercial laundry workers in New York), available at http:// 
www.nycosh.org (last visited Mar. 30, 2001); Occupational Safety & Health Admin., U.S. 
Dep't of Labor, Ergonomics Programs Prevent Injuries, Save Money, available at www.osha-
slc.gov/SLTC/ergonomics/ergofilm.html (last visited Mar. 30, 2001) (describing the 
successful efforts of the union at Navistar's diesel engine plant in Illinois to create an 
ergonomics program). 
2001] FULFILliNG THE BARGAIN 1143 
many employers, 11 as well as an increased focus of·governmental atten-
tion. 12 1n 1990, Secretary of Labor Elizabeth Dole proposed developing 
an ergonomic standard for employers, and despite strong resistance from 
the business community and Republicans in Congress, the standard was 
finally promulgated in the closing days of the Clinton Administration. 13 
But after the election of President George W. Bush, the Republican-con-
trolled Congress acted quickly to repeal the regulations, using the 1996 
Congressional Review Act for the first time to overturn an agency rule. 14 
The bill was signed by President Bush as the first major law of his 
presidency.15 
This Note argues thatjudges in workers' compensation cases should 
use ergonomic evidence and the lens of the original workers' compensa-
tion "bargain" in deciding close cases about "work-relatedness." As it is 
commonly understood, state statutes creating workers' compensation 
consist of a bargain between employees and employers: Employees gave 
up their common-law right to sue employers in tort for workplace inju-
ries, but were guaranteed a right to recovery under workers' compensa-
11. According to OSHA, three-<juarters of businesses with 500 or more employees 
have analyzed ergonomic hazards and taken some steps to decrease the risk of CTDs, but 
fewer than 30% of employers with 20 or fewer employees have taken such steps. See 
Statement of LPA The Ergonomics Rule: OSHA's Interface with State Workers' 
Compensation Laws: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Employment, Safety, and Training 
of the S. Health, Education, Labor and Pensions Comm., 106th Con g. 2 (2000) (statement 
of Charles N.Jeffress, Asst. Sec'y for Occupational Safety and Health, U.S. Dep't of Labor). 
I2. Since the late 1980s, OSHA has fined employers for ergonomic violations 
accompanied by evidence of a high rate of cumulative trauma injuries. In I988, OSHA 
levied a $3.1 million fine against IBP, the nation's largest meat packer, for exposing 20% of 
it~ employees to the risk of developing CTDs. John Morrell & Company, another meat 
packer, was fined $4.3 million for similar reasons. William J. Maakestad & Charles Helm, 
Promoting Workplace Safety and Health in the Post-Regulatory Era: A Primer on Non-
OSHA Legal Incentives that Influence Employer Decisions to Control Occupational 
Hazards, I7 N. Ky. L. Rev. 9, I0-11 (I989). 
Similar actions by OSHA resulted in agreements with all of the Big Three auto 
companies-General Motors, Ford, and Chrysler-to implement comprehensive 
ergonomic programs in order to reduce occupational injury rates. After employers 
challenged OSHA's authority to issue citations for ergonomic violations, the Occupational 
Health and Safety Commission held that ergonomic problems were "recognized hazards" 
that employers had a "general duty" to avoid. See Sec'y of Labor v. Pepperidge Farm Inc., 
I7 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) I993 (OSHRC 1997) (holding that ergonomics hazards, in 
particular lifting and repetitive motion, may be cited under the general duty clause of 
Occupational Safety and Health Act). The question of the applicability of the "general 
duty" clause of the Occupational Health and Safety Act to ergonomic violations took 
several years to reach the courts because the fines imposed by OSHA employers for 
ergonomic violations generally induced employers to settle, rather than challenge OSHA 
through the courts. David J. Kolesar, Note, Cumulative Trauma Disorders: OSHA's 
General Duty Clause and the Need for an Ergonomics Standard, 90 Mich. L. Rev. 2079, 
2088-89 ( 1992). 
I3. Ergonomics Program Star.dard, 29 C.F.R. §I910.900 (2000). 
14. Pub. L. No. 107-5 (March 20, 200I). 
15. Statement by the President, The White House, Office of the Press Secretary (Mar. 
20, 2001). 
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tion without having to prove fault, while employers agreed to more cer-
tain recovery by employees for work-related injuries, but with a limit on 
damages. An analysis of cases in workers' compensation and tort, how-
ever, reveals that this bargain is betrayed for workers with CTDs, with 
claimants in tort often finding it easier to prove liability as compared to 
those receiving workers' compensation. Ultimately, this Note proposes 
an ergonomics-based burden-shifting framework that achieves the initial 
intent of workers' compensation while taking advantage of contemporary 
advances in science and health. 
Part 1 explores the "original bargain" of workers' compensation, its 
common-law roots, and its subsequent expansion to cover illnesses and 
injuries beyond the paradigmatic industrial accident. Part II looks closely 
at the case law surrounding proof of causation for CTDs, focusing specifi-
cally on the differential treatment under workers' compensation laws and 
the common-law tort system. Part Ill argues for the importance of using 
the "original bargain" lens in interpreting workers' compensation laws 
and considers how ergonomics can inform this analysis. Part III ulti-
mately puts forward a specific burden-shifting framework that uses ergo-
nomic principles to help assess the "work-relatedness" of CTDs in work-
ers' compensation cases. 
I. THE ORIGINAL BARGAIN: STATE WORKERS' COMPENSATION REGIMES 
In the nineteenth century, employers had no responsibility to com-
pensate employees for harm suffered in the workplace. At that time, it 
was thought that taking any job meant that the worker assumed the risk 
of injury, particularly if it was an expected occupational hazard. 16 This 
consensus changed in the late nineteenth century, when railroads were 
being built and workers were being injured in the process.I7 Under the 
fault-based tort system, plaintiffs experienced occasional success before 
juries in recovering large damage awards. 18 As a result of these develop-
16. See Russell Furbee Ethridge, Note, Workmen's Compensation: The Cumulative 
lnjury Doctrine, 81 W. Va. L. Rev. 435, 439 (1979) ("[l]t was generally not considered 
negligent to allow an employee to work in an unhealthy environment if this environment 
was a normal condition of the industry."); Caroline Mitchell, Products Liability, 
Workmen's Compensation and the Industrial Accident, 14 Duq. L. Rev. 349, 350 (1976) 
("Despite the lack of any conscious, voluntary choice on the part of an employee to subject 
himself to an occupational hazard, he had no right to collect for an injury arising from 
dangers normally incident to his employment."). 
17. See Lawrence M. Friedman & Jack Ladinsky, Social Change and the Law of 
Industrial Accidents, 67 Colum. L. Rev. 50, 52 (1967) ("The explosive growth of tort law 
was directly related to the rapidity of industrial development. The staple source of tort 
litigation was and is the impact of machines-railroad engines, then factory machines, 
then automobiles-on the human body."). Railroads accounted for more serious industrial 
accidents than any other enterprise in the middle of the nineteenth century. Id. at 60 
n.34. 
18. Although it was still highly uncertain that plaintiffs would recover, the large jury 
verdicts in cases of recovery meant that litigation presented a serious risk for employers. 
Nat' I Acad. of Soc. lns., 1997-1998 Workers' Compensation, supra note 8, at 3 ("Under the 
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ments, employers pushed to create a workers' compensation system in 
order to limit and make more predictable the amount of damages paid 
out. By 1920, all but seven states had enacted workers' compensation 
laws, and today, each of the fifty states and the District of Columbia has its 
own program. 19 
The workers' compensation "bargain" between employers and em-
ployees was intended to be simple: In exchange for immunity from tort 
actions, employers would provide employees with swift, though limited, 
compensation for work-related injuries. 20 Both sides gained from this 
trade-off.21 Employers received a measure of protection from sizable jury 
verdicts for workplace injuries, while employees significantly increased 
tort system, workers often did not recover damages and sometimes experienced delays or 
high costs when they did. While employers generally prevailed in court, they nonetheless 
were at risk for substantial and unpredictable losses if the workers' suits were successful."); 
Terry Thomason et al., Workers' Compensation: Benefits, Costs, and Safety Under 
Alternative Insurance Arrangements 5 (200I) ("On those infrequent occasions when 
employees did win these lawsuits, employers sometimes had to pay substantial cash awards. 
"). 
I9. Nat'l Acad. of Soc. Ins., I997-I998 Workers' Compensation, supra note 8, at 2. 
Much has been written about the history of workers' compensation laws and their 
common-law roots. For a good start, see generally James R. Chelius, Liability for Industrial 
Accidents: A Comparison of Negligence and Strict Liability Systems, 5 J. Legal Stud. 293, 
298-30I (I976) (discussing rise of workers' compensation as a move from a negligence 
regime to one of "shared strict liability"); Richard A. Epstein, The Historical Origins and 
Economic Structure of Workers' Compensation Law, I6 Ga. L. Rev. 775, 775 (1982) 
(discussing the stages of development of workers' compensation systems); Friedman & 
Ladinsky, supra note I7, at 52 (using the development of workers' compensation as a case 
study for the relationship between social change and the development of the law); Arthur 
Larson, The Nature and Origins of Workmen's Compensation, 37 Cornell L.Q. 206, 206 
(I952) (describing the history and characteristics of workers' compensation); John Fabian 
Witt, Note, The Transformation of Work and the Law of Workplace Accidents, I842-I9IO, 
I 07 Yale LJ. I467, I484-96 (I998) (examining the development of workers' compensation 
in light of the changing character and conception of work). 
20. Before workers' compensation statutes had been passed, the New York Employers' 
Liability Commission, in I910, reported that delay for an injured worker receiving 
compensation, either directly from his employer or after a court ruling, ran from six 
months to six years. See Friedman & Ladinsky, supra note I7, at 66. 
21. See Boggs v. Blue Diamond Coal Co., 590 F.2d 655, 659 (6th Cir. I979) (calling 
the common-law remedies exchanged in the original bargain "of dubious value"); see also 
Ellen R. Peirce & Terry Morehead Dworkin, Workers' Compensation and Occupational 
Disease: A Return to Original Intent, 67 Or. L. Rev. 649, 653 (1988). Pierce and 
Morehead write: 
The legal theory most often used to describe the rationale for the workers' 
compensation system is the social compromise theory, providing that both 
employers and employees gained and lost rights when workers' compensation 
replaced employers' tort liability. The employer compromised by waiving all of its 
common-law defenses to a claim, and by compensating workers for all job-related 
injuries irrespective of fault; the worker compromised by waiving the right to 
maintain a tort action against the employer, and by accepting a more certain but 
smaller, often predetermined amount of money as compensation for an injury. 
Id. (footnotes omitted); see, e.g., Alice M. Thomas, The Law of Workers' Compensation: 
Defining Accidental Injury, 30 How. LJ. 5I5, 5I5 (I987) (stating that drafters of federal 
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their chance of receiving compensation. 22 Employers could no longer try 
to demonstrate that they were not at fault, or assert one of the "unholy 
trinity" of affirmative defenses-assumption of risk, contributory negli-
gence, and the fellow-servant rule. 23 Both sides lost something as well, of 
course: Employees necessarily capped their potential compensation,24 
and employers-at least in theory-agreed to compensate workers more 
readily. 25 Both sides also achieved a measure of predictability: Employ-
ees ostensibly received a guarantee of compensation, employers could 
purchase insurance at fixed prices to cover the costs of workplace inju-
ries, and both sides-along with society-avoided the transaction costs 
and uncertainty of litigation.26 This balancing embraced the original 
bargain. 
and state workers' compensation statutes "successfully reached a compromise" between 
employers and employees). 
22. Friedman ~ Ladinsky, supra note 17, at 69 ("In exchange for certainty of recovery 
by the worker, the companies were prepared to demand certainty and predictability of 
loss-that is, limitation of recovery."). 
23. Id. at 70. 
24. Less commented on in discussions of the "original bargain" is that employees gave 
up the ability to have their right to compensation determined by a jury. Most 
commentators treat this simply as a matter of dollars-jury verdicts are likely to be higher 
than administrative Jaw judges' awards. But there is also the difference of jury members 
being more likely to identify with the claimant and understand the realities of the work 
environment and the physical demands of many blue-collar jobs. For a rare example of an 
administrative Jaw judge's personal identification with the claimant appearing to play a 
role in awarding compensability, see Blaser v. Country Club of Beloit, Claim No. 
1996052288, 1998 WI Wrk. Comp. LEXJS 243, at *16-*18 (Wis. Labor & Indus. Review 
Comm'njuly 29, 1998). In Blaser, the judge wrote: 
I d. 
This particular ALJ has used this kind of a mop on the job, in high school while 
'swabbing the deck' in a restaurant kitchen and in the U.S. Army while mopping 
the mess hall and kitchen and barracks floors. Even these fairly limited 
experiences remind one of the amount of force and energy in the hands and 
wrists needed to get the floors mopped and cleaned in a manner satisfactory to a 
demanding overseer .... Like Mr. Blaser's use of what 1 infer was an electrical 
floor buffer, I used this kind of buffer myself years ago; and I can still recall the 
amount of power needed in my hands and wrists to keep it under control, as it 
were. 
25. After New York passed its workers' compensation Jaw, insurance companies raised 
their rates considerably-indicating the belief that employers' costs would be highe1· under 
workers' compensation as compared to the common law. Witt, supra note 19, at 1485. 
Subsequent studies have indicated that workers' compensation did in fact have the effect 
of raising the cost of work accidents to employers. See Mark Aldrich, Safety First: 
Technology, Labor, and Business in the Building of American Work Safety, 1870-1939, at 
96-97, 344 n.49 (1997). 
26. Transaction and litigation costs are actually often quite high in workers' 
compensation cases, undermining one of the main goals of the original "bargain." See, 
e.g., Williams Co. v. Lawrence, 824 P.2d 1134, 1137 (Okla. 1992) ("We are not unmindful 
of the significant length of time many of these cases necessitate to reach a final 
adjudication."); Zurn Indus. v. Workers' Comp. Appeal Bd., 755 A.2d 108, 109 (Pa. 
Commw. Ct. 2000) ("When Anthony Bottoni filed a simple Workers' Compensation claim 
in 1986, we doubt he would have expected it to drag on into the new millennium."). 
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The scope of the workers' compensation system reflected the com-
mon-law tort system it replaced.27 Common-law tort actions for work-
place injuries and illnesses were generally limited to industrial acci-
dents-the factory worker whose hand is mangled in a machine, or the 
railroad worker who gets burned by falling sparks. This industrial-acci-
dent paradigm carried over to the workers' compensation system that re-
placed tort remedies for workplace injuries.28 Cumulative trauma inju-
ries, along with occupational diseases and psychological injuries, were 
left out of this paradigm, in part reflecting contemporary notions of em-
ployer responsibility.29 
27. Traditional accounts of the history of workers' compensation in the United States 
tend to agree that the workers' compensation system reflected the notion of what should 
and should not be compensated under the common-law, fault-based system. In other 
words, workers' compensation codified, in a sense, existing notions of fault. But the 
implications of this are generally overlooked in most accounts. See Friedman & Ladinsky, 
supra note 17, at 71 ("In essence, then, workmen's compensation was designed to replace a 
highly unsatisfactory system with a rational, actuarial one. It should not be viewed as the 
replacement of a fault-oriented compensation system with one unconcerned with fault."). 
28. Because this paradigm is fairly limited, many observers believe that for most of its 
existence, workers' compensation has not covered the majority of employment-related 
injuries and illnesses. Orin Kramer & Richard Briffault, Workers Compensation: 
Strengthening the Social Compact 8-9 (1991) ("In unwitting imitation of the common-
law's approach to industrial accidents, workers' compensation's traditionally limited 
coverage of occupational disease and archaic procedural barriers left many victims of 
illness without compensation."). As Dembe and others have pointed out, what counts as a 
work-related injury or disease is affected by many social factors that vary across time and 
place. 
As Richard Epstein has pointed out, the major weakness of the original bargain was its 
rigidity and incapacity for self-correction. As a result, the definition of what counts as a 
compensable event has been expanded through judicial interpretation and legislative 
enactment-changes that Epstein would evaluate with reference to "the dominant 
contractual norm" underlying the system. See Epstein, supra note 19, at 808-09. The 
approach of this Note is similar, but adopts as its reference point the norm within the 
common-law tort system. 
29. One prominent attorney who wrote about workplace accident law in the early 
twentieth century argued that responsibility, not fault, was the true principle that ought to 
guide the law of workplace accidents. "The rule of personal liability rests not upon a 
notion of actual fault on the part of the individual charged with liability, but upon the 
reasonable imputation of fault arising out of his responsible connection with the 
instrumentality through which the injury was caused." J. Walter Lord, Employers' Liability 
and Workmen's Compensation Laws 13 (1912) (cited in Witt, supra note 19, at 1490 
n.124). 
Indeed, as Professor McCluskey has pointed out, workers' compensation is sometimes 
explained "as a recognition of employer responsibility for work accidents." Martha T. 
McCluskey, The Illusion of Efficiency in Workers' Compensation "Reform," 50 Rutgers L. 
Rev. 657, 730 n.277 (1998). 
[R]ecent workers' compensation reform efforts typically claim to restore the 
"work" standard of liability that is central to the cost-internalizing theory of the 
workers' compensation bargain. But this "employment relationship" standard for 
allocating accident costs requires judgments about what is necessary and 
inevitable to the employment relationship .... Those judgments incorporate 
normative determinations about employees' and employers' respective burdens 
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With heightened public attention and changes in social understand-
ing of work-related illnesses and injuries, occupational diseases, such as 
asbestosis, became covered either judicially or by statute.30 More re-
cently, CTD claims have become a focus of workers' compensation sys-
tems-in some jurisdictions covered as an "injury," in others as a "dis-
ease," but often falling through the cracks of the system altogether. 
Part 11 of this Note focuses on the difficulty of proving work-related-
ness for CTD claims under workers' compensation, as compared with 
proving causation in common-law tort. Part III presents potential solu-
tions to this discrepancy. 
11. BETRAYING THE BARGAIN: THE DIVERGENCE oF WoRKERs' 
CoMPENSATION FROM THE ToRT SYSTEM 
Until the past two decades, CTDs were rarely considered compensa-
ble injuries under workers' compensation.31 In fact, they were mostly 
considered the "aches and pains" of life, or natural "wear-and-tear," 
rather than occupational injuries or illnesses. Concurrent with the ex-
pansion of occupational disease coverage, some jurisdictions began to 
recognize cumulative trauma injuries as compensable.32 In order to do 
so, these jurisdictions liberally construed statutory requirements that an 
and duties of care in the employment relationship-in effect, returning to the 
original problem of determining worker versus employer fault. 
Id. at 732-33 (internal citations omitted). 
30. For an overview of the treatment of occupational diseases under workers' 
compensation laws, see Peter S. Barth & H. Allan Hunt, Workers' Compensation and 
Work-Related Illnesses and Diseases (1982). 
31. The term "cumulative trauma disorder" was first used in the 1970s. But the 
concept-and its frequent relation to work-has existed for centuries. Dembe, supra note 
3, at 27. A few jurisdictions have recognized cumulative trauma injuries as compensable 
for many years, often classifYing them as occupational diseases. E.g., Underwood v. Nat'! 
Motor Castings Div., 45 N.W.2d 286, 288 (Mich. 1951) (awarding compensation for injury 
resulting from repeated "bending and twisting that ... was a part of [claimant's] job"); 
Sears-Roebuck & Co. v. Starnes, 26 S.W.2d 128, 129 (Tenn. 1930) (affirming award of 
compensation to a department-store employee who developed an infection in her finger 
after operating a listing machine requiring approximately 10,000 strokes daily). 
32. See, e.g., Fmehauf Corp. v. Workmen's Comp. Appeals Bd., 440 P.2d 236, 240 
(Cal. 1968) ("We are convinced that it was the Legislature's intention to classifY injuries 
resulting from continuous cumulative traumas which are minor in themselves but 
eventually result in disability as occupational diseases."); McKeever Custom Cabinets v. 
Smith, 379 N.W.2d 368, 373 (Iowa 1985) (citing cases recognizing gradual injuries in 
several states); Lilly v. State Workmen's Comp. Comm'r, 225 S.E.2d 214, 218 (W.Va. 1976) 
("[A]n employee who is injured gradually by reason of the duties of employment and 
eventually becomes disabled is no less the recipient of a personal injury than one who 
suffers a single disabling trauma."). But see Bowman v. Nat'! Graphics Corp., 378 N.E.2d 
1056, 1058 (Ohio 1978) (denying compensation on the basis that claimant's "disability 
simply developed gradually over a period of time as a result of performing his normal work 
activities"). 
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injury be caused "by accident"33 at a definite time and place,34 or that an 
occupational disease be "unique to employment or the particular occupa-
tion."35 Courts continue to have difficulty deciding whether CTDs are 
33. For CTDs, there is often no specific "accident" that activates the symptoms. As 
one cabinetmaker explained when testifYing as to when his injury occurred, "[T] hat was 
hard for me to distinguish because we use sanders and hand tools a lot and a lot of times 
you would experience strain. It was just like if you hold something at an angle a lot or the 
drills or the sanders a lot, you'd get like a fatigue and a strain." McKeever, 379 N.W.2d at 
371. 
In response to this problem, many jurisdictions have essentially read out the 
"accident" requirement or interpreted it as simply requiring an unexpected occurrence or 
result. See, e.g., Duvall v. ICI Arns., Inc., 621 N.E.2d 1122, 1126 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993) 
(defining an injury as "accidental" when it is the "unexpected consequence of the usual 
exertion or routine performance of the particular employee's duties" (citing Evans v. 
Yankeetown Dock Corp., 491 N.E.2d 969, 974 (Ind. 1986))); Rice v. AT&T, 614 So. 2d 358, 
360 (La. Ct. App. 1993) (concluding that "the legislature did not intend to limit the 
definition of accident to only extraordinary exertions"); Flint Constr. Co. v. Downum, 444 
P.2d 200, 203 (Okla. 1968) (accidental injury may arise from the cumulative effect of a 
series of events). Such broad interpretations are helped along by statutory language in 
some jurisdictions. See, e.g., Kansas' Workers Compensation Act, Kan. Stat. Ann. §44-
508(d) (Supp. 1999) ("The elements of an accident, as stated herein, are not to be 
construed in a strict and literal sense, but in a manner designed to effectuate the purpose 
of the workers compensation act that the employer bear the expense of accidental injury to 
a worker caused by the employment."). 
Virginia is a notable exception to the general liberal construction of the "accident" 
requirement. See, e.g., Kraft Dairy Group, Inc. v. Bernardini, 329 S.E.2d 46, 48 (Va. 1985) 
("[A] n injury resulting from the cumulative trauma caused by the physical exertions 
inherent in an employee's normal work is not an 'injury by accident' ... .");Robinson v. 
Olan Mills, Inc., VWC File No. 188-57-55, 1999 VA Wrk. Camp. LEXIS 363, at *5 (Va. 
Workers' Camp. Comm'n, Mar. 11, 1999) (ruling that the claimant did not suffer a 
compensable "injury by accident" because her injury resulted from the cumulative effects 
of heavy work performed over the course of approximately one hour or more). 
34. Cumulative trauma injuries, by definition, occur gradually-and the time and 
place of injury cannot therefore be pinpointed. Some courts have liberalized the 
requirement so that the onset of symptoms can qualifY as the definite time and place of 
injury. Others have used lessons from ergonomics to recognize that many jobs are 
designed in such a way that each act or repetitive motion is essentially a "micro-trauma"-
each of which can be identified as having a definite time and place. 
35. CTDs have often not been able to overcome this barrier. The kinds of symptoms 
reported by many workers with CTDs-aching, pain or tingling in the hands or wrists-
were seen as common to many occupations, or part of the "natural aging process." See, 
e.g., Gencarelle v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 892 F.2d 173, 176-78 (2d Cir. 1989) (holding that 
cumulative trauma injury from repeated straining of the knees was not "peculiar" enough 
to employment as a maintenance man to be compensable as an occupational disease under 
the federal Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (LHWCA)). Judge 
Learned Hand argued that it was necessary to limit coverage to occupational diseases 
"resulting from working conditions peculiar to the calling" so as not to turn the LHWCA 
into a general health insurance statute. Grain Handling Co. v. Sweeney, 102 F.2d 464, 465 
(2d Cir. 1939) (cited in Gencarelle, 892 F.2d at 177); see also LeBlanc v. Cooper/T. Smith 
Stevedoring, Inc., 130 F.3d 157, 160 (5th Cir. 1997) (ruling that degenerative lower back 
condition was not peculiar to claimant's line of work as a longshoreman and therefore was 
not an occupational disease for LHWCA purposes); Adams v. Contributory Ret. Appeals 
Bd., 609 N.E.2d 62, 66 (Mass. 1993) ("UJob duties involving common movements done 
frequently by many humans both in and out of work will not be sufficient to establish an 
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more properly classified as an "injury" or "disease." Medically, the condi-
tion is more consistent with injury, but workers' compensation statutes 
have distinguished between injury and disease on the basis that an injury 
is unexpected and sudden, whereas a disease is a natural incident of em-
ployment and occurs gradually.3 6 
The ability to get compensation for a CTD varies considerably from 
state to state. A recent national survey on the treatment of CTDs under 
workers' compensation laws found that compensation for a CTD claim is 
"very likely" in ten states; "likely" in fifteen states; "fair" in fifteen states; 
and "case-by-case" in ten states.37 Some of this divergence stems from 
variations in the statutes/18 but much of it simply reflects confusion over 
how to classify those disorders which have no simple medical explanation, 
and do not neatly fit into either the "accident" or "disease" categories that 
entitlement .... "); Fuller v. Motel 6, 526 S.E.2d 480, 484-85 (N.C. Ct. App. 2000) (disease 
must be characteristic of a trade or occupation) (citing Hansel v. Sherman Textiles, 283 
S.E.2d 101, 105-06 (N.C. 1981)); Rivera v. Cosrich, lnc., No. 94-025070, 1998 NJ. Wrk. 
Comp. LEXIS 104, at *20-*21 (NJ. Dep't of Labor Div. of Wrk. Comp. Mar. 16, 1998) 
(deciding that "[m]ere standing on one's feet" is not peculiar to the employment and 
therefore the injury is not compensable); In re Popham v. Indus. Comm'n, 214 N.E.2d 80, 
82 (Ohio 1966) (ruling that claimant's arthrosis is not compensable because it is the 
"common and generally held consensus" that the disease results from ordinary "wear and 
tear"); Kelly v. American Airlines, I.C. No. 709796, 1998 NC Wrk. Comp. LEXIS 2529, at *3 
(N.C. Indus. Comm'n Oct. 16, 1998) (ruling that airline reservationist who worked on a 
keyboard all day did not have increased risk of carpal tunnel syndrome compared to 
members of the general public because "[u]nlike the work of a medical or legal 
transcriptionist, plaintiffs typing duties did not require her to type constantly"). But see ln 
re Dep't of Health and Human Servs., 761 A.2d 431, 435 (N.H. 2000) ("[I]t is not a 
requirement of the Workers' Compensation Law that the injury be peculiar to the 
claimant's job."); Clark v. Excel Corp., W.C. No. 4-347-891, 1999 Colo. Wrk. Comp. LEXIS 
146, at *3-*4 (Colo. Indus. Claim App. Office June 23, 1999) (upholding administrative 
law judge's inference that standing and lifting boxes on hard and uneven flooring 
constituted special hazards of employment); Peirce & Dworkin, supra note 21, at 660-61 
("In order to maintain the work-related requirement ... coverage was extended only if the 
employee's workplace exposure to the disease was greater or different than that which 
affected the public generally."). For jurisdictions that write such a definition into their 
statute, see, e.g., Ala. Code§ 25-5-110(4) (2000); NJ. Stat. Ann.§ 34:15-3l(a) (West 2000). 
36. lt has become increasingly clear that jobs with recognized ergonomic hazards will 
have the expected result of ir-Uury, but injuries by definition are "unexpected" and "by 
accident." See, e.g., Young v. Wal-Mart, Claim No. 1995038023, 1998 WI Wrk. Comp. 
LEXIS 133, at *11 (Wis. Labor & Indus. Review Comm'n Apr. 28, 1998) (concluding that 
"an injury by cumulative trauma would be the antithesis of an ir-Uury by accident"). 
37. Ctr. for Office Tech., Report on State Treatment of Cumulative Trauma Disorders 
1 (Jan. 22, 1999) (on file with the Columbia Law Review), available at http:/ /www.cot.org/ 
workers.html (last visited Mar. 31, 2001). The Center for Office Technology is a 
Washington organization, funded by several major corporations, that promotes "voluntary" 
solutions to ergonomic issues. 
38. The survey also found that in twenty states, CTDs are specifically recognized by 
statute; in eighteen states, either carpal tunnel syndrome is recognized by statute or CTDs 
are included in the occupational disease or injury definition; and thirteen states do not 
recognize CTDs. Id. 
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the statutes create.39 In some jurisdictions, cumulative, trauma injuries 
often go uncompensated, even though they would likely be recognized as 
the employer's responsibility in the tort system. And as two leading com-
mentators point out, "even in jurisdictions that nominally compensate 
these injuries, many claims go uncompensated."40 
In the last decade, the business community and insurance industry 
have argued-with some accompanying success in state legislatures-that 
the increased range of compensable injuries and accompanying benefit 
payments has tilted the terms of the bargain too far toward employees.41 
39. Different jurisdictions deal with this problem in different ways. See, for example, 
the Alabama Workers' Compensation Act, where the statutory definition of injury caused 
by an accident includes cumulative trauma disorders. Ala. Code § 25-5-1 (9) (2000). In 
other jurisdictions, courts have made this decision on an ad hoc basis. See, e.g., Found. 
Constructors, Inc. v. Dir., Office of Workers Comp. Programs, 950 F.2d 621, 623-24 (9th 
Cir. 1991) (deciding that claimant's back condition is an injury, not a disease, under the 
federal Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act); Fruehauf Corp. v. 
Workmen's Comp. Appeals Bd., 68 Cal. 2d 569, 576 (Cal. 1968) (deciding that California 
statutory definition of "occupational disease" includes CTDs); Duvall v. lCl Ams., Inc., 621 
N.E.2d 1122, 1125 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993) (upholding the Board's finding that plaintiff's 
carpal tunnel syndrome-caused by daily trauma to her hand and wrist-was an injury, not 
a disease, for purposes of the workers' compensation statute); Schlup v. Auburn 
Needleworks, Inc., 479 N.W.2d 440, 445 (Neb. 1992) (considering a condition resulting 
from the cumulative effects of repeated work-related trauma under the statutory definition 
of "accident" (citing Maxson v. Michael Todd & Co., 469 N.W.2d 542, 544 (Neb. 1991))); 
Ball-Incon Glass Packaging v. Taber, 888 P.2d 2, 4-5 (Okla. Ct. App. 1994) (ruling that 
occupational disease, as distinguished from a cumulative trauma injury, must be 
distinguished by a "gradual onset" and result from a "systemic reaction to something in the 
work environment which is introduced into the body"). 
Deciding which category repetitive trauma injuries fall into often requires peculiar 
twists of logic, and claimants sometimes lose entirely because of statutory technicalities that 
would not come into play in tort. See the sarcastic observations of one Nebraska judge 
who writes: 
[T]his court continues to lie in its Procrustean bed made of 'repetitive trauma' 
decisions based on a distorted definition of 'accident' in the Nebraska Workers' 
Compensation Act .... Although '[h]ope springs eternal,' employees injured by 
repetitive work-related trauma are a little more mortal and need a remedy under 
the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act. 
Schlup, 479 N.W.2d at 451 (Shanahan, J., concurring); see also Merillat Indus., Inc. v. 
Parks, 436 S.E.2d 600, 601-02 (Va. 1993) ("We based our ... position, in part, on our 
conclusion that the categories of compensable injuries created by the legislature-
accidental injury and occupational disease-are separate, meaningful categories."). 
40. See John F. Burton, Jr. & Emily A. Spieler, Compensation for Disabled Workers: 
Workers' Compensation, in New Approaches To Disability in the Workplace 205, 224 
(Terry Thomason et al. eds., 1998). 
41. The continued rhetoric of a "cost crisis" in workers' compensation is inconsistent 
with the most recent data. A recent report found that as a share of covered payroll, 
workers' compensation benefits and costs in 1996 had declined by about 23% from their 
all-time high in 1992 and 1993. See Nat'l Acad. Of Soc. Ins., Workers' Compensation: 
Benefits, Coverage, and Costs, 1996, New Estimates 1 (1999), available at http:/ I 
www.nasi.org/WorkComp/1996Data/wc96rptmain.htm (last visited Mar. 30, 2001). For 
critical analysis of these changes to state workers' compensation statutes, see James 
Ellenberger, The Battle over Workers' Compensation, Working USA, Sept.-Oct. 1999, at 
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But the relevant comparison, in assessing the balance of the bargain, is 
not between the scope of workers' compensation today versus the scope 
during times past. The relevant comparison is what employers would be 
held liable for in today's tort system, and whether that is reflected in the 
scope of the workers' compensation system today.42 
This Part will specifically compare the difficulty of proving the causal 
relationship between work and injury for CTD claims under workers' 
compensation, as compared with proving causation in common-law tort. 
In doing so, this Part draws on traditional tort principles, Texas work-
place tort law cases,43 product liability cases involving CTDs, and claims 
brought under the Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA). As this Part 
will demonstrate, workers' compensation jurisprudence has betrayed the 
original bargain-more certain but limited recovery-by often making it 
more difficult to prove compensability for legitimate, work-related inju-
ries under workers' compensation than under the tort system. 
A. The Nature of The Causation Inquiry 
The causation inquiry in personal irtiury tort cases differs in impor-
tant ways from the causation inquiry in workers' compensation cases. 
These differences have particularly significant implications for CTD 
claimants. The traditional causation inquiry in tort consists of two 
parts-cause in fact" and "proximate cause." The "cause in fact" is also 
known as "but for" causation, indicating the idea that "but for" the defen-
dant's action or inaction, the harm would not have occurred. Generally 
plaintiffs can satisfy this requirement fairly easily. On the other hand, the 
"proximate cause" question-essentially a glorified inquiry into policy 
considerations to decide whether the defendant should be held liable for 
his action-raises much more complex questions. Plaintiffs frequently 
must overcome the burden of demonstrating that the harm was "foresee-
able" enough for the defendant's action or inaction to be considered the 
"proximate cause" of the harm. 
The requirement in virtually all workers' compensation statutes that 
the injury or illness "arise in the course of employment" has commonly 
been translated to mean that the injury or illness be "work-related." In 
23. For a more straightf01ward, if not unbiased view, see Ctr. for Office Tech., supra note 
37. 
42. As Professor McCluskey points out, "(i]f one takes the more plaintiff-oriented 
contemporary tort system, rather than the 19th-century tort system, as the baseline, then 
workers' overall gain from the bargain is less substantial." McCluskey, supra note 29, at 896. 
The importance of this comparison is discussed in greater detail infra Part liLA. 
43. Texas is the only state where workers' compensation is voluntary for employers. 
Therefore, workers in Texas whose employers have opted out of the workers' 
compensation system can bring tort claims for workplace i~uries. A 1996 survey found 
that 39% of the employers in Texas do not carry workers' compensation coverage, and 
they employ approximately 20% of the Texas workforce. Research and Oversight Council 
on Workers' Comp., Experiences of Injured Workers Employed by Nonsubscribing 
Employers 1 (Mar. 1997). 
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terms of tort principles, "work-relatedness" stands in for causation-the 
question being whether the work activity was responsible for the illness or 
injury. This tort-style causation inquiry tends to be where all the "action" 
in workers' compensation litigation takes place.44 But the "work-related" 
requirement in workers' compensation cases is dealt with somewhat dif-
ferently than causation in tort. 
Many workers' compensation jurisdictions use the two-part legal and 
medical causation inquiry.45 ln a sense, it mirrors the two-pronged causa-
tion inquiry in tort-with medical causation the equivalent of "but for" 
causation,46 and legal causation another way of discussing "proximate 
cause."47 ln lay terms, the medical and "but for" causation inquiries both 
ask the question: if not for the factor in question (here, the work activity), 
44. E.g., Jordan Yospe, Note and Comment, U.S. Industries v. Director: "Claim" 
Versus "Condition" in the Analysis of Workers' Compensation Cases, 12 Am. J.L. & Med. 
273, 274 (1986) ("The crux of workers' compensation litigation, regardless of the statute 
under scrutiny, appears to center upon the 'arising out of and in the course of 
employment' requirement."). 
45. E.g., Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Domingo, 764 So. 2d 1287, 1290 (Ala. Civ. App. 2000) 
("To establish causation in a workers' compensation case ... where the injury was not 
caused by some sudden and unexpected external event, an employee must satisfY a two-
part causation test by producing substantial evidence establishing both (a) legal causation 
and (b) medical causation." (citing City of Tuscaloosa v. Howard, 318 So. 2d 729 (Ala. Civ. 
App. 1975))); Appeal of Burleigh Briggs, 645 A.2d 655,659 (N.H. 1994) ("Under this test, 
the petitioner must 'prove legal causation, that is, that [his] injury is work-connected, and 
medical causation, that is, that [his] disability was actually caused by the work-related 
event."' (quoting Tzimas v. Coiffures By Michael, 606 A.2d 1082, 1083 (N.H. 1992))); 
Hone v.J.F. Shea Co., 728 P.2d 1008, lOll (Utah 1986) (describing the two-part legal and 
medical causation test) (citing Allen v. Indus. Comm'n, 729 P.2d 15 (Utah 1986). But see 
Dun & Bradstreet Corp. v.Jones, 678 So. 2d 181, 185-86 (Ala. Civ. App. 1996) (explaining 
that for cumulative trauma disorders, the legislature's 1992 amendments eliminated the 
accident requirement and combined legal and medical causation into one inquiry); Blaser 
v. Country Cluh of Beloit, Claim No. 1996052288, 1998 WI Wrk. Comp. LEXIS 243, at *21 
(Wis. Labor & Indus. Review Comm'n July 29, 1998) (describing the "arising out of" 
causation question as "medico-legal"). 
46. See, e.g., Ex parte Trinity Industries, Inc, 680 So. 2d 262, 269 (Ala. 1996) 
(requiring substantial evidence that the exposure to risk or danger in the workplace "was 
in fact [a] contributing cause of the injury"); Appeal of Bellisle, 738 A.2d 946, 949 (N.H. 
1999) ("[A]n employee must show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the work-
related activities probably caused or contributed to the employee's disabling injury as a 
matter of medical fact .... An employee need not prove direct causation but must establish 
that the activities caused the activation of disabling symptoms." (citing Appeal of Kehoe, 
686 A.2d 749, 752-53 (N.H. 1996))); Yospe, supra note 44, at 283 ("Courts must determine 
whether the injury is a physical consequence of workplace activity. This is denoted 
'medical causation.'"). 
47. See, e.g., Trinity, 680 So. 2d at 267 (establishing that proof of legal causation 
requires demonstrating that "the performance of his or her duties as an employee exposed 
him or her to a danger or risk materially in excess of that to which people are normally 
exposed in their everyday lives" (discussing Tuscaloosa, 318 So. 2d at 732)); Kehoe, 686 A.2d 
at 752 ("Where there is no pre-existing condition, any work-related activity connected with 
the injury as a matter of medical fact would be sufficient to show legal causation."); Burleigh 
Briggs, 645 A.2d at 659 ("To prove legal causation, where ... the petitioner concedes a pre-
existing weakness or condition, he must show that his work-related activities substantially 
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would the plaintiff/ claimant be injured? Meanwhile, the legal and "prox-
imate cause" inquiries ask: should the defendant (here, the employer) be 
held responsible for the harm? But while legal causation tends to be 
glossed over in workers' compensation cases, the issue of medical causa-
tion tends to turn many workers' compensation hearings-especially 
those involving CTDs-into a "battle of dueling doctors" that is not par-
ticularly enlightening as to the ultimate legal question of whether the 
employers should be held responsible.48 
This problem is compounded by the fact that doctors and lawyers 
tend to have very different understandings of what constitutes causation. 
In medicine, causation is discoverable by scientific proof, while in law, 
causation is a means of assigning the burden of persuasion based on pol-
icy considerations.49 It is commonly observed that medical causation is a 
more demanding standard than legal causation50, but the inquiries are 
also simply different. One doctor, recognizing this distinction, refused to 
take a position on the question of causation in a workers' compensation 
case, stating: "I feel that whether this repetitive trauma is considered to 
be a cause of her ruptured disc or not is a legal question rather than a 
medical one."51 The focus on medical causation in workers' compensa-
tion cases is particularly harmful to CTD claimants because of the multi-
ple factors inevitably involved in such injuries. 
The treatment of multiple causal factors is another important area 
where workers' compensation diverges from tort law. According to black-
letter tort law, the existence of more than one cause for an injury does 
contributed to his disability by showing that the work-related activities required more 
exertion than his non-work-related activities."). 
48. As one commentator put it, the "legal question is how much workplace 
contribution will be enough to trigger the employer's liability under workers' 
compensation." Yospe, supra note 44, at 275. 
49. As one Kentucky court explained: 
The legal profession and the medical profession view causation problems from 
different perspectives. The physician defines cause in terms of single and isolated 
bits of scientific exactitude. The lawyer views cause as a vehicle for adjusting 
losses in accordance with the policy conditions which are embodied in social 
legislation such as our workmen's compensation law. 
Hudson v. Owens, 439 S.W.2d 565, 569 (Ky. Ct. App. 1969). 
50. See Kent Louis Brown, Medical Problems and the Law 204-05 (1971) (explaining 
that most medical practitioners do not understand the difference between probable and 
possible as distinguished by the law); Douglas Danner & Elliot L. Sagall, Medicolegal 
Causation: A Source of Professional Misunderstanding, 3 Am. J.L. & Med. 303, 304-05 
(1977) (distinguishing the legal standard for cause from the more demanding 
requirement of scientific proof sought by the medical profession); Donna H. Smith, Note, 
Increased Risk of Harm: A New Standard for Sufficiency of Evidence of Causation in 
Medical Malpractice Cases, 65 B.U. L. Rev. 275, 279 (1985) ("Physicians, unaware of the 
difference between medical certainty and legal certainty, will not testify that a result was 
certain to follow. They fail to understand that legal causation requirements are less 
demanding than scientific proof of medical causation."). 
51. W. Elec. Co. v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd., 99 Cal. App. 3d 629, 635 n.1 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 1979). 
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not excuse any particular defendant from liability if that defendant's ac-
tion or omission was a "substantial factor" in causing the harm . .'\ 2 The 
language of workers' compensation decisions, however, reveals quite a 
different approach. 
Workers' compensation judges often discuss the issue of causation as 
if there were only one cause for each injury-an approach that may have 
made sense under the industrial-accident paradigm but is divorced from 
the medical reality of occupational diseases and CTDs. Pinpointing one 
causal factor is next to impossible for multi-factor disorders like cumula-
tive trauma injuries.53 lt is often difficult, for example, to identifY the 
extent to which an injury is the result of work-related cumulative trauma 
over several years, or the result of the "natural aging process. "54 
52. Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts 268 (W. Page Keeton et al. eds., 5th ed. 
1984) ("If the defendant's conduct was a substantial factor in causing the plaintiff's injury, 
it follows that he will not be absolved from liability merely because other causes have 
contributed to the result, since such causes, innumerable, are always present."). 
53. See, e.g., Yospe, supra note 44, at 297 ("Assessments of the 'cause' of a cumulative 
injury should be grounded in the realities and limits of medical diagnostic techniques."); 
see also Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Domingo, 764 So. 2d 1287, 1288-89 (Ala. Civ. App. 2000) 
(noting doctor's testimony that "a clear etiology is rarely diagnosed" for Kienbock's 
disease-a wrist disorder commonly caused by repetitive trauma); Pulaski v. Occupational 
Safety & Health Stds. Bd., 75 Cal. App. 4th 1315, 1324 n.3 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999) (describing 
CTDs as the function of an interplay among three factors: "amount of tissue damage 
relating to the force and duration of exposure; individual parameters such as age, obesity, 
and prior medical conditions; and psychological and psychosocial factors such as stress" 
(citing Mackinnon & Novak, Repetitive Strain in the Workplace, J. of Hand Surgery, Jan. 
1997, at 2)); Hill v. Father Flanagan's Boys' Town, H & AS No. 99-318, 1999 D.C. Wrk. 
Comp. LEXIS 481, at *7-*8 (D. C., Office ofEmp. Serv. Dec. 30, 1999) ("Q.Just a minute, 
Doctor. To a reasonable medical certainty, can you determine whether or not this box 
incident did indeed materially aggravate Ms. Hill's back? A. No .... [O]ur science is not 
good enough to pin a direct etiology for her symptoms."); In re Comp. of Esch, No. 96-
10094, 1998 Or. Wrk. Comp. LEXIS 204, at *12 (Or. Wrk. Comp. Bd. Mar. 13, 1998) 
(noting that treating physician's report indicated that etiology of claimant's back pain was 
"multifactorial," although primarily due to work-related cumulative trauma); Madsen v. 
Northwestern Mutual Life, Claim No. 1996045948, 1999 WI Wrk. Comp. LEX1S 13, at *10 
(Wis. Labor & Indus. Review Bd.Jan. 29, 1999) (doctor's letter said "both injuries [one at 
home and one at workl ... were contributing factors to her current condition, and it 
would be impossible for me to tell to what extent and to what magnitude .... "). 
54. The "natural aging process" is a concept often written into statutes. E.g., Kansas 
Workers' Compensation Act, Kan. Stat. Ann. § 44-508(e) (Supp. 1998) ("An injury shall 
not be deemed to have been directly caused by the employment where it is shown that the 
employee suffers disability as a result of the natural aging process or by the normal 
activities of day-to-day living."). But such statutory language does not provide much 
guidance to judges, other than reinforcing the requirement of work-relatedness. E.g., Hill, 
1999 D.C. Wrk. Comp. LEXIS 481, at *8 (doctor acknowledging difficulty of isolating 
causation by saying of claimant: "As you know, she had a history of something approaching 
trauma. She also got six years older and I am not smart enough to tell you which one 
caused the change. How's that?"); Turley v. State of Kansas, Docket No. 247,457, 1999 KS 
Wrk. Comp. LEXIS 450, at *2 (Kan. Div. of Workers' Comp. Nov. 1999) ("Unfortunately, 
the Workers Compensation Act does not define the phrase 'normal activities of day-to-day 
living.'"); Williamson v. Central Locating Service, Docket No. 242,656, 1999 KS Wrk. 
Comp. LEXIS 234, at *3 (Kan. Div. of Workers' Comp.June 1999) (distinguishing walking, 
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To take the prototypical industrial accident as an example, the lack 
of a safety guard on a machine can be quite clearly the cause of a worker 
losing a finger. In contrast, the development of a CTD by someone who 
works in a poultry processing plant, for example, might be primarily due 
to her work activities, but contributed to secondarily by the regular activ-
ity of fishing, gardening, or picking up and holding a young child. 
Under the "substantial factor" test of tort law, the work activities would no 
doubt be enough to hold the employer liable, but under workers' com-
pensation, judges often hold in such a scenario that the plaintiff has not 
carried her burden of proof in showing that the injury was work-related. 
The critical question is: Who will bear the risk of the medical uncer-
tainty? Certainly traditional tort law, where the plaintiff carries the bur-
den of proof, places the risk of uncertainty on the plaintiff. And workers' 
compensation statutes, by and large, do the same by placing the burden 
of proof on the claimant to prove that the injury was work-related. 
Within that context, however, judges deciding workers' compensation 
cases must consider how claimants can carry their burden of proof in light 
of the original bargain-that compensability (or liability in tort) would 
be easier to prove under workers' compensation laws than under com-
mon law. 
B. Permissible Inferences: Evidence To Prove Causation 
1. Inferring Causation From Circumstantial Evidence. - Given the na-
ture of CTDs, inferences-as opposed to direct proof-are necessary to 
establish medical causation. An examination of common-law tort and 
FELA cases indicates that judges and juries are much more willing to 
make inferences about the causal link between work activities and an em-
ployee's injury than judges in the workers' compensation systemY' These 
inferences can be seen in some workers' compensation cases, but they are 
the exception.56 In these common law and FELA cases, courts allow in-
an activity of daily living, from walking on muddy and uneven terrain, not a normal activity 
of daily living, for purposes of compensation); In re Comp. of Thorn, WCB Case No. 98-
00579, 1999 Or. Wrk. Comp. LEXIS 280, at *5-*6 (Or. Workers' Comp. Bd. AprilS, 1999) 
(testimony of doctor that "nothing is presented during shoulder surgery that would enable 
a surgeon to distinguish between findings caused by the natural aging process and findings 
caused by employment" and cause of shoulder condition is thus "idiopathic" or unknown). 
55. See Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts, supra note 52, at 270 
("Circumstantial evidence, expert testimony, or common knowledge may provide a basis 
from which the causal sequence may be inferred.") (footnotes omitted). 
56. See, e.g., Decker v. Square D Co., 1998 MOWCLR (LRP) LEXIS 58, at *6-*7 (Mo. 
App. 1998) (stating that "[t)he evidence must establish a direct causal link between a 
worker's workplace or job duties and the injury-causing disease."); Eaton v. Quincy, 1999 
Ill. Wrk. Comp. LEXIS 44, at *23 (Indus. Comm'n of Ill. May 28, 1999) (Kinnaman, J., 
dissenting) ("In this case the majority finds that a firefighter who sits underneath the 
engine's siren every time he is out on a call has not proven sufficient exposure to noise to 
win compensation for the resulting hearing loss. The finding defies common sense and 
the weight of the evidence."); Santos v. Beman Foods, Inc., 1998 NJ. Wrk. Comp. LEX1S 
96, at *21-*22 (NJ Div. Wrk. Comp. Oct. 5, 1998) (finding doctor's explanation 
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ferences from circumstantial evidence to prove that work activities caused 
CTDs.57 For example, in a Texas case, a group of employees from a ma-
jor meatpacking plant brought a negligence claim against their employer, 
who did not participate in Texas' workers' compensation system, charg-
ing that their work conditions caused them to develop CTDs.58 The 
plaintiffs were allowed to prove causation with circumstantial evidence-
presenting evidence of the ergonomic risk factors in the meatpacking 
plant where they worked, and the medical records of the doctors who 
"unconvincing" that claimant's serious joint condition was related to having worked in a 
freezer for more than twenty years). But see, e.g., King v. Vt. Am. Corp., 664 So. 2d 214, 
217 (Ala. Civ. App. 1994) (Robertson, J., dissenting) (arguing that claimant's carpal tunnel 
syndrome and repetitive wrist action associated with her job as an assembly-line worker was 
enough to support the inference that her injury was aggravated by work); Clark v. Excel 
Corp., W.C. No. 4-347-891, 1999 Colo. Wrk. Comp. LEXlS 146, at *3 (Colo. Indus. Claim 
App. Office June 23, 1999) (inferring causation from claimant's testimony on the 
circumstances of his employment and medical experts' testimony on the acceleration of 
claimant's condition); Riggs v. The Boeing Co., Docket No. 223,954, 1999 KS Wrk. Comp. 
LEXIS 342, at *II (Kan. Div. of Workers' Comp. Aug. 1999) (inferring causation from 
physicians' diagnosis of an overuse or cumulative trauma disorder, and the fact that work 
restrictions were prescribed to prevent further ii"!iury); Zapata v. IBP, Docket No. 168,210, 
1999 KS Wrk. Comp. LEXIS 96, at *20-*21 (Kan. Div. of Workers' Comp. Apr. 1999) 
(awarding compensation to claimant for new injuries because the jobs that employer 
returned claimant to after being treated for carpal tunnel syndrome were all outside his 
doctor's restrictions on repetitive activities); Thomas v. Tidewater Mechanical Contractors, 
Inc., V\VC File No. 184-88-17, 1999 VA Wrk. Comp. LEXIS 306, *7-*8 (Va. Workers' 
Comp. Comm'n Jan. 13, 1999) (noting that the workers' compensation commission "may 
find a causal relationship without a definitive medical statement regarding causation if the 
factual testimony is not inconsistent with the medical reports and establishes a fairly 
obvious link from which we may reasonably infer causation"); Steere v. Rich Products 
Corp., VWC File No. 185-45-69, 1999 VA Wrk. Comp. LEXIS 323, at *9 (Va. Workers' 
Comp. Comm'n Jan. 12, 1999) (ruling that "uncontradicted medical evidence" ascribing 
the claimant's unusual disease to work, combined with the "undisputed circumstantial 
evidence" surrounding the onset of the condition after a freezer fire, established causation 
despite doctors' inability to make a specific diagnosis). See also Bryan v. Allstate Timber 
Co., 724 So. 2d 853, 855 (La. Ct. App. 1998) (explaining that worker's testimony alone can 
carry his burden of proof for an "accident" claim provided that no other evidence casts 
serious doubt upon the worker's version of the incident; and the worker's testimony is 
corroborated by the circumstances following the alleged incident) (citing Garner v. SheatB 
& Frazier, 663 So. 2d 57, 60 (La. Ct. App. 1995)). 
57. E.g., Gutierrez v. Excel Corp., 1997 U.S. App. LEXlS 12984, at *8 (5th Cir. 1997) 
(noting that under Texas tort law, causation and foreseeability can be established by direct 
or circumstantial evidence); Aparicio v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co., 84 F.3d 803, 812 (6th Cir. 
1996) (holding, in FELA case, that deposition of railroad's medical director permitted the 
inference that a person exposed to a risk factor for injury or illness may develop the injury 
or illness as a result); Schaefer v. Union Pac. R.R., 10 F. Supp. 2d 1240, 1248 (D. Wyo. 
1998) (acknowledging that the jury can infer the railroad's breach of duty in FELA case, 
but holding that the plaintiff has not produced even a "scintilla" of evidence). 
58. Gutierrez, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 12984, at *4. The case was in federal court 
because of diversity of citizenship. The employer, Excel Corp., was a nonsubscriber to the 
Texas workers' compensation system and therefore subject to common-law causes of action 
such as negligence. Id. at *5 n.3. 
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examined them. 59 This is precisely the type of inference that is typically 
denied in CTD cases under workers' compensation-where proving com-
pensability is supposed to be easier than in tort. 1n addition, employees 
who bring product liability claims against the manufacturer of a product 
that causes a work-related CTD are often able to get to a jury on causation 
without direct evidence.60 
Because FElA requires that plaintiffs prove all of the common-law 
elements of tort, but has a relaxed evidentiary standard, a FElA claim 
should be less difficult to prove than a common-law tort claim, yet more 
difficult to prove than a workers' compensation claim.61 But with CTD 
59. ld. at *9. "[l]t is apparent that the working situation at the Whizard table was rife 
with conditions known to cause, or at least to be associated with, cumulative trauma 
disorder." ld. at *11. The Fifth Circuit accepted the possibility of an inference of 
causation by holding that: 
[I]f a plaintiff can establish that she was exposed to enough of the risk factors for 
a sufficiently long period of time, and that she suffers from a specific injury 
defined as a cumulative trauma disorder, then it is not, as a matter of law, 
necessary to present evidence directly stating that the work environment caused 
the injury. A reasonable jury could infer causation in these circumstances. 
Id. at *16. Unfortunately for the particular plaintiff, the court also ruled that she "did not 
present such testimony in this case" because her condition "was not one associated with 
cumulative trauma." Id. 
60. See, e.g., Bone v. Ames Taping Tool Sys., Inc., 179 F.3d 1080, 1082 (8th Cir. 1999) 
(reversing district court's grant of summary judgment to defendant on causation); 
Tenbarge v. Ames Taping Tool Sys., Inc., 128 F.3d 656, 658 (8th Cir. 1997) (same); Rice v. 
United Parcel Serv. Gen. Servs. Co., 43 F. Supp. 2d 1134, 1146 (D. Or. 1999) (denying 
defendants' motion for summary judgment on issue of proximate cause); White v. Chi. 
Pneumatic Tool Co., 994 F. Supp. 1478, 1481 (S.D. Ga. 1998) (same); Vass v. Compaq 
Computer Corp., 953 F. Supp. 114, 118 (D. Md. 1997) (recognizing the possible inference 
that plaintiff knew "that there was very likely a connection between her use of a computer 
keyboard as a legal secretary and her increasing pain and discomfort"). Employees are 
generally permitted to bring a claim either against a third-party tortfeasor, such as the 
product manufacturer, or file a workers' compensation claim. 
61. The Federal Employers' Liability Act was intended to depart from common-law 
principles of liability in order to provide additional protection and relief for railroad 
workers. A FELA plaintiff must prove the traditional common-law elements of a tort: 
breach of a duty (negligence), foreseeability, and causation. But the plaintiff need only 
provide "more than a scintilla of evidence" to prove negligence and can show causation by 
demonstrating that an employer's action played "some part" in causing the injury. See 
Aparicio, 84 F.3d at 810. 
Recently, the Supreme Court explained the Act as a "federal remedy [for railroad 
workers] that shifted part of the 'human overhead' of doing business from employees to 
their employers." Consol. Rail Corp. v. Gottshall, 512 U.S. 532, 542 (1994). This 
justification is very similar to that typically used in explaining workers' compensation 
statutes. In fact, Justice Harlan once wrote in a dissenting opinion that "(t]his case is a 
further step in a course of decisions through which the Court has been rapidly converting 
the Federal Employers' Liability Act ... [into] a workmen's compensation statute." Sinkler 
v. Mo. Pac. R.R. Co., 356 U.S. 326, 332-33 (1958) (Harlan,]., dissenting). Justice Harlan 
was reacting to what he perceived as the ease with which the Court was allowing FELA 
plaintiffs to create a jury question. Today, however, he might be surprised at how much 
more difficult it is to receive compensation for certain litigated workers' compensation 
claims, as compared with FELA claims. 
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cases, the ability to use circumstantial evidence-as in common-law tort 
cases-often makes it easier to prove a FELA claim than the same claim 
under workers' compensation. ln one Sixth Circuit FELA case, the court 
held that the deposition of the employer's medical director permitted an 
inference that a person with a risk factor for injury or illness may result in 
the person with the risk factor developing the injury or illness.fi2 The 
court used this inference, combined with evidence of the foreseeability 
that the repetitive vibrations and shocks of the employee's job might 
cause repetitive motion injury, to decide that the plaintiff had presented 
sufficient evidence to create a jury question on causation.fi3 Again, this 
type of inference would likely be denied under workers' compensation. 
The inability to use circumstantial evidence in workers' compensa-
tion is compounded by the requirements of objective medical evidence. 
Workers' compensation judge often deny benefits for CTDs based on a 
lack of "objective medical findings"-a requirement that is often written 
into statute and rarely used in common-law tort cases.64 Cumulative 
trauma injuries, by definition, occur gradually and often without symp-
toms that are either visible or "objective" in the sense of being measura-
ble on medical tests. This problem is itself compounded by many em-
ployees' lack of awareness of the nature of cumulative trauma injuries.05 
Nonetheless, there is little doubt that repetitive work activities often play 
a substantial role in the appearance of CTDs. 
2. Inferring Causation From Negligence. -Another problem in proving 
causation under workers' compensation is that not having to prove "fault" 
or negligence may actually be a detriment to employees, and even to em-
ployers in some cases. It is well recognized that the negligence and causa-
tion inquiries are not completely separate,66 but are merely ways of an-
62. Aparicio, 84 F.3d at 812. 
63. Id. at 812-13. 
64. E.g., Frew v. McDonnell Douglas, 932 P.2d 35, 37 (Okla. Ct. App. 1996) 
(upholding the trial court's denial of benefits based in part on the finding that claimant's 
complaints were not supported by "objective tests," despite the fact that McDonnell 
Douglas' own doctor found the injury to be work-related);Jackson v. County of Wayne, 12 
MIWCLR (LRP) 1287, at *22-*23 (Workers' Comp. App. Comm'n June 29, 1999) 
(reversing the magistrate's award of benefits because of a lack of "objective evidence" on 
work-relatedness). Most jurisdictions contend that pain symptoms are not sufficiently 
"objective." But see Schlup v. Auburn Needleworks, Inc., 479 N.W.2d 440, 446 (Neb. 1992) 
(ruling that pain symptoms can constitute "objective symptoms" as required by the 
Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act (quoting Sandel v. Packaging Co. of Am., 317 
N.W.2d 910, 915-16 (Neb. 1982))). 
65. See, e.g., Galloway v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd., 74 Cal. Rptr. 2d 374, 376 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 1998) (noting that the claimant, an ironworker, had only a sixth-grade education 
and testified that he did not understand that injuries could occur as a result of cumulative 
trauma rather than from a specific incident); Weise v. Becton-Dick.inson Co., 4 NCA 700, 
1993 Neb. App. LEXIS 367, at *7 (Neb. Ct. App. 1993) (noting that, until she visited a 
doctor, claimant attributed symptoms to her pregnancy). 
66. In tort claims, evidence of "fault" by the plaintiff or defendant is often used in 
deciding the appropriate causal connection. See, e.g., Tenbarge v. Ames Taping Tool Sys., 
Inc., 190 F.3d 862, 865 (8th Cir. 1999) (citing the testimony of defendant's medical expert 
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swering the overall question: Should a defendant be held responsible for 
harm caused to a plaintiff? Indeed, the ability of plaintiffs to infer causa-
tion from evidence of negligence is an important contemporary develop-
ment in tort doctrine-one that is not available to claimants in the "no-
fault" workers' compensation system. 
In workers' compensation cases, judges often deny compensation to 
claimants who rely on what appears to be a "fault"-based argument for 
compensability. In the controversial case Waskiewicz v. General Motors 
Corp.,67 for example, the Maryland Court of Appeals specifically rejected 
the claimant's argument as too heavily based upon employer "fault." As 
the court explained: 
we must assume that Mr. Waskiewicz's argument before us is 
founded on the notion that the employer's actions in removing 
him from and then reassigning him to the repetitive motion 
work were the significant events triggering a new claim .... 
GM's "fault" impliedly underlies Mr. Waskiewicz's entire theory· 
of recovery. Workers' compensation is a "no-fault" system, ren-
dering the very foundation of Mr. Waskiewicz's argument quite 
shaky.68 
This case is a perfect example of a workers' compensation claim 
where the claimant would have had a significantly better chance of recov-
ery had he been able to litigate fault, either instead of causation or as a 
factor weighing in favor of compensability. Indeed, the court in Was-
kiewicz explicitly acknowledges this, and implicitly acknowledges that Mr. 
Waskiewicz is failed by an overly formalistic reading of the statute, when it 
writes: 
We recognize that the recent aggravation of Mr. Waskiewicz's 
disability occurred at least in part because GM knowingly re-
moved him from light duty and placed him at risk of such aggra-
vation by assigning him back to an assembly-line job where his 
duties would include repetitive hand motions. Were the issue 
that he "cannot rule out alcohol" as a cause of plaintiffs carpal tunnel syndrome because 
"he does consume some"); Mosley v. Excel Corp., 109 F.3d 1006, 1013 (5th Cir. 1997) 
(discussing "but for" causation in the context of employer's alleged negligence). And in 
workers' compensation, employee fault often plays a more significant role than a "no-fault" 
statute should allow. For a particularly egregious twenty-first century example, see Tamar 
Lewin, Commission Sues Railroad to End Genetic Testing in Work Injury Cases, N.Y. 
Times, Feb. 10, 2001, at AIO (reporting on a recent EEOC action against a major railroad 
for genetically testing the hlood of workers who filed workers' compensation claims for 
carpal tunnel syndrome). Here, the employer was trying to demonstrate that the injury was 
the fault of the workers' own genes. 
67. 679 A.2d 1094, 1102 (Md. 1996) (denying henefits, in a 4-3 decision, on the 
grounds that a worsening of one's condition cannot give rise to a new claim for benefits, 
even though claimant's employer knowingly reassigned the disabled worker to repetitive 
motion work, which had caused the original condition). 
68. 1d. at 1100. 
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before us a question of equity rather than statutory law, GM 
would surely not fare so well. 69 
1161 
C. Enhanced Procedural and Substantive Burdens in Workers' Compensation 
Cases 
1n the face of the medical uncertainty surrounding cumulative 
trauma disorders, the burden of proof, resting on the claimant to prove 
work-relatedness by a "preponderance of the evidence," is often decisive 
in workers' compensation cases.70 There are many workers' compensa-
tion cases where it is clear that if the plaintiff had the benefit of a pre-
sumption of work-relatedness, the result would be different. This com-
monly occurs when there is conflicting medical testimony that is given 
equal weight by the judge. 1n such a situation, the judge will often say 
that the claimant loses because she has not carried her burden of proof. 
Since the employer is bound to present a medical expert who will say that 
the injury is not work-related, this scenario occurs quite frequently. 71 
1n recent years, often as a reaction to growing claims for CTDs, state 
legislatures-and in some cases,judges-have acted to raise the procedu-
ral burden of proof necessary for compensability beyond what would be 
required in tort. A few states have required as much as "clear and con-
69. ld. at I 101. For an example from the employer's perspective, see Derr Constr. Co. 
v. Bennett, 873 S.W.2d 824, 826 (Ky. 1994) (upholding the Board's rejection of the 
employer's "fault based" argument that it should not be liable for medical expenses related 
to disability predating the specific workplace incident). 
70. See, e.g., Peirce & Dworkin, supra note 21, at 662 ("Who bears the burden of 
proof on causation often determines whether or not an injured worker will be 
compensated. The majority of states place the burden of proof on the claimant to 
establish that the disease is causally related to the worker's employment."). Since the 
claimant must use expert medical testimony to meet the burdens of proof, he or she bears 
the risks of limitations in medical knowledge. !d. at 677-78. 
71. See, e.g., Carney v. TCI Cablevision of Tulsa, 942 P.2d 763, 764 (Okla. Ct. App. 
1997) (rejecting claimant's argument that employer had to present medical evidence to 
disprove the existence of compensable injury); Rodney v. Michelin Tire Corp., 466 S.E.2d 
357, 359 (S.C. 1996) (upholding commission's denial of benefits where there was 
"conflicting evidence" on work-relatedness); Tilden v. Kaydon, Docket No. 1998 ACO 416, 
1998 MIWCLR (LRP) LEXIS 267, at *4-*6 (Workers' Comp. App. Comm'njune 30, 1998) 
(upholding magistrate's determination that plaintiff's evidence was "insufficiently 
persuasive" of a causal relationship, and noting that defendants were "under no obligation 
to prove non-work-related causation"); In re Comp. of Thorn, WCB Case No. 98-00579, 
1999 Or. Wrk. Comp. LEXIS 280, at *6 (Or. Workers' Comp. Bd. April 8, 1999) ("[A]t 
best, the medical evidence regarding causation is in equipoise, and claimant has failed to 
carry her burden of proof."); Madsen v. Northwestern Mutual Life, Claim No. 1996045948, 
1999 WI Wrk. Comp. LEX1S 13, at *16 (Wis. Labor & Indus. Review Comm'n Jan. 29, 
1999) (ruling that claimant did not establish work-related causation, based in part on 
doctor's note mentioning "the possibility of making a case either way on causation"). 
Compare these cases to those in the few jurisdictions that do employ a statutory 
presumption in favor of work-relatedness. See, e.g., Hill v. Father Flanigan's Boys' Town, 
H&AS No. 99-318, 1999 D.C. Wrk. Comp. LEXIS 481, at *8 (D.C., Office of Employment 
Servs., Hearings & Adjudication Section Dec. 30, 1999) (finding injury compensable in the 
absence of sufticient evidence to rebut the statutory presumption). 
1162 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 101:1140 
vincing evidence" that the injury is work-related in order to grant relief.72 
1n tort, of course, the standard for proving causation-and all elements 
of the claim-is "preponderance of the evidence." Again, this creates a 
perverse situation-contrary to the original bargain-in which workers' 
compensation claims are significantly more difficult to prove than tort 
claims. Indeed, meeting the standard of "clear and convincing evidence" 
has proven to be nearly impossible for cumulative trauma injuries. Be-
cause the injury is generally not visible, and occurs gradually, the causal 
factors are particularly difficult to isolate. 
Distinct from the procedural burden of proof, some legislatures and 
judges have also imposed increased substantive standards of causation.73 
Some states have required that work be a "major contributing factor" or 
account for more than fifty percent of the cause of the injury-greater 
than the "substantial factor" or "foreseeability" tests used to determine 
proximate cause in tort.74 Because cumulative trauma disorders are gen-
72. For example, the Alabama Workers' Compensation Act, as amended in 1992, 
specifies that cases involving injuries which have resulted from "gradual deterioration or 
cumulative physical stress disorders" will be deemed compensable only upon a finding of 
"clear and convincing proof' that the injuries were work-related. Ala. Code § 25-5-81 (c) 
(2000). Besides cumulative trauma injuries, other types of injuries or diseases-
particularly psychological or heart-related injuries-are sometimes required to meet a 
higher burden of proof. See, e.g., Fla. Stat. Ann.§ 440.09(1) (West Supp. 2000) ("Mental 
or nervous injuries occurring as a manifestation of an injury compensable under this 
section shall be demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence."). 
73. See, e.g., New Jersey's Occupational Disease Law, NJ. Stat. Ann. § 34:15-31 (a) 
(2000) (disease must be "due in a material degree" to work conditions); Reeves Motor Co. 
v. Reeves, 105 A.2d 236, 239 (Md. 1954) (holding that "proximate cause" in workers' 
compensation cases "means that the result could have been caused by the accident and 
that no other efficient cause has intervened"); Brandt v. Leon Plastics, Inc., 483 N.W.2d 
523, 525 (Neb. 1992) (defining the requirement of proving "proximate causation" as 
showing that the repeated traumas contributed "in some material and substantial degree" 
to the claimant's injury); Gilchrist v. Trail King Indus., Inc., 612 N.W.2d 1, 3-5 (S.D. 2000) 
(affirming the Department of Labor's ruling that the claimant's carpal tunnel condition 
was work-related, and noting that the causation requirement is not one of "proximate" 
cause but rather that the employment was a "contributing factor" to the injury) (citing 
Caldwell v.John Morrell & Co., 489 N.W.2d 353, 357 (S.D. 1992)); Rivera v. Cosrich, Inc., 
No. 94-025070, 1998 NJ. Wrk. Comp. LEXIS 104, at *8 (NJ. Dep't of Labor Div. ofWrk. 
Comp. Mar. 16, 1998) (employee must show the work was at least a contributing cause of 
the injury (citing Coleman v. Cycle Transformer Corp., 105 NJ. 285 (1985))); In re Comp. 
of Thorn, No. 98-00579, 1999 Or. Wrk. Comp. LEXIS 280, at *4 n.2 ("Because this is an 
occupational disease claim, claimant must prove that employment conditions were the 
major contributing cause of the disease ... ." (citing ORS 656.802(2) (a) and (b))); In re 
Robert Burton, Jr., No. 97-3633, 1998 WA Wrk. Comp. LEXIS 190, at *15 (Wash. Indus. 
Ins. App. Office Nov. 5, 1998) (holding that claimant did not demonstrate "proximate 
cause" and that a "temporal relationship" is not enough to sustain claimant's burden); 
Williams v. Cardinal Insulated Glass, No. 1996046744, 1998 WI Wrk. Comp. LEXIS 346, at 
*13 (Wis. Labor & Indus. Review Comm'n Dec. 4, 1998) ("The question is whether the 
applicant's work activities were a material contributory factor in the onset or progression of 
her condition."). 
74. For a critical overview of both the substantive and procedural changes, see 
McCluskey, supra note 29, at 788-808. 
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erally multi-causal, it is extremely difficult to show that work activities-or 
any one causal agent-accounted for more than fifty percent of the cause 
of injury. Moreover, most jurisdictions require a "probability," not just a 
"possibility," that work activities caused the disease or injury.75 The im-
pact of the recent statutory changes is clear: Workers often will not re-
cover on workers' compensation claims that would result in employer lia-
bility if adjudicated as tort claims. 
Certainly legislatures have the authority to make such changes. But 
any changes must be interpreted through the "original bargain" lens. 
The intent of the workers' compensation system was to make proving 
compensability easier for claimants, while restricting the amount that 
could be recovered. But this has not happened for CTDs. By refusing to 
allow inferences, raising the burden of proof, and raising substantive stan-
dards for causation, many jurisdictions have made it even more difficult 
to prove causation for legitimate CTD claimants under workers' compen-
sation laws than in tort-a result clearly counter to the original bargain. 
111. REsTORING THE BARGAIN: A SET OF PROPOSALs FOR CTD CAsEs 
UNDER WoRKERS' CoMPENSATION 
Part liLA of this Note argues for the methodological importance and 
propriety of using the "original bargain" lens for judicial interpretation of 
workers' compensation statutes. This method is particularly appropriate 
and necessary because of the nature of state workers' compensation stat-
utes-statutes designed to replace common-law rights and obligations. 
Part lii.B demonstrates how judges can use ergonomic evidence to draw 
inferences about causation in a way that is consistent with current work-
75. See, e.g., Decker v. Square D Co., 974 S.W.2d 667, 669 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998) 
(stating that in carpal tunnel syndrome cases, the plaintiff must submit a medical expert 
who can establish a probability that working conditions caused the disease); Owen v. 
American Hydraulics, Inc., 578 N.W.2d 57, 63 (Neb. I998) ("A workers' compensation 
award cannot be based on possibility or speculation, and if an inference favorable to the 
claimant can be reached only on the basis thereof, then the claimant cannot recover."); 
Laffey v. City of Jersey City, 289 NJ. Super. 292, 308 (App. Div. I996) (describing the 
claimants's burden as one of presenting "sufficient, credible, objective evidence" to allow 
the compensation court to determine with "cautious reasoned probability" that the 
occupational exposure caused the disease); Handyv. Amfibe, Inc., No. 179-49-39, I998 VA 
Wrk. Camp. LEXIS 4343, at *6-7 (Va. Workers' Camp. Comm'n Dec. 14, 1998) ("The 
'possibility' that an injury is related to the employment is not sufficient to produce a 
compensable claim, the requisite standard being medical 'probability.'"). But see, e.g., 
Wallen v. Salon of Music, Inc., 418 So. 2d 421, 42I (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. I982) (finding that 
the workers' compensation commissioner placed "too great a burden of proof as to 
causation" upon the claimant by denying benefits despite the testimony of two 
cardiologists that additional stress from a work-related accident "could have contributed" 
to the onset of claimant's heart attack). 
Common-law and FELA tort cases offer a contrast. In such cases, medical or 
ergonomic testimony that there is a "possibility" that work activities caused the injury, 
combined with credible testimony from the claimant, can be enough to allow an inference 
of causation. See supra notes 57-63 and accompanying text. 
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ers' compensation statutes, developments in common-law tort jurispru-
dence, and the "original bargain." Part Ill.C presents a specific burden-
shifting framework for treatment of CTDs in workers' compensation cases 
in order to achieve this end. Part 1II.D explains the importance of the 
application of the "exclusive remedy" doctrine as a self-correcting mecha-
nism to ensure appropriate compensation for employees. 
A. Using the "Original Bargain" Lens in Workers' Compensation Cases 
Courts have used the "original bargain" theory in a number of work-
ers' compensation cases as a "purposive" method of statutory interpreta-
tion.76 With this interpretive method, judges look to the statute's pur-
pose and act as "faithful agents" of-or "cooperative partners" with-the 
legislature in making decisions. 77 In doing so, judges have taken notice 
76. See Jonathan Woodner Co. v. Mather, 210 F.2d 868, 873-74 (D.C. Cir. 1954) 
("The rationale underlying these [exclusive remedy] cases, though not articulated, seems 
clear .... The employer has gained an immunity from common law suit. The employee 
has gained a right to relief even where his injury did not arise through the fault of his 
employer."); M. Thomas Arnold, Gradually Developed Disabilities: A Dilemma for 
Workers' Compensation, 15 Akron L. Rev. 13, 15 (1981); see also Vigliotti v. K-mart Corp., 
680 So. 2d 466, 467 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (concluding that strict construction of the 
term "work performed" would "contravene the legislative intent to ensure the prompt 
delivery of benefits to the irtiured worker by an efficient and self-executing system"); 
Guilbeaux v. Martin Mills, Inc., 640 So. 2d 472, 475 (La. Ct. App. 1994) (interpreting the 
statutory requirement that an injury be "more than a gradual deterioration or progressive 
degeneration" as only applying to non-work activity on the grounds that "to interpret it 
otherwise ... would lead to an absurd result as it would negate the very purpose for which 
the Workers' Compensation Act was instituted; namely, to provide relief to employees 
whose work has caused them injury and the inability to work"); DesMarais v. Strauss & 
Troy, 699 N.E.2d 113, 116 (Ohio Ct. App. 1997) ("Such a result is contrary to the purpose 
of the workers' compensation statutes, which is to provide compensation for employees 
injured or disabled because of their employment."); Eaton v. Quincy, No. 89 WC 12084, 
1999 Ill. Wrk. Comp. LEXlS 44, at *27 (Indus. Comm'n of 111. May 28, 1999) (Kinnaman, 
J., dissenting) ("When a firefighter is exposed to noise ... over a period of 14 years, he is 
entitled to compensation for the resulting hearing loss. The Legislature could not have 
meant to deny compensation simply because he failed to show documentation that the 
noise exposure exceeded 15 minutes on any given day."). But see Waskiewicz v. General 
Motors Corp., 679 A.2d 1094, 1101-02 (Md. 1996) ("[I]f we held that GM's actions in re-
assigning Mr. Waskiewicz to job duties he had held in the past constituted a compensable 
event, we would be in essence writing new legislation."). 
77. Purposivism, of course, has been the subject of much debate in legal literature-a 
full review of which is beyond the scope of this Note. The canonical expression of 
purposivism is Henry M. Hart, Jr. & Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process 1-4, 1374-80 
(William N. Eskridge, Jr. & PhilipP. Frickey eds., 1994) (lOth ed. 1958). Other leading 
pieces supporting the method include Guido Calabresi, A Common Law for the Age of 
Statutes 164 (1982) (describing a judge's task as deciding "when a retentionist or a 
revisionist bias is appropriately applied to an existing statutory or common law rule"); 
William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation 48 (1994) (arguing that 
statutory interpretation "involves policy choices and discretion by the interpreter over time 
as she applies the statute to specific problems"); Harlan F. Stone, The Common Law in the 
United States, 50 Harv. L. Rev. 4, 15 (1936) (arguing that statutes should be treated like 
judicial precedents, as a "premise for legal reasoning"). For an overview of current debates 
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of the remedial nature of workers' compensation statutes78 and, in many 
states, have concluded that the statute should be liberally construed in 
favor of the employee.79 Indeed, judges in at least one state have already 
narrowly interpreted recent restrictions on CTD compensability in order 
to uphold the remedial intent of the original statute.80 And judges in 
other jurisdictions have used the "original bargain" lens to indicate that 
in statutory interpretation, see Robert A. Katzmann, Courts and Congress 46-68 ( 1997) 
(surveying puposivism, public choice theory, textualism, and the use of legislative history). 
78. See, e.g., Driscoll v. Gen. Nutrition Corp., 752 A.2d 1069, 1073 (Conn. 2000) 
("Our Workers' Compensation Act indisputably is a remedial statute that should be 
construed generously to accomplish its purpose."); King v. Dep't of Employment Servs., 
742 A.2d 460, 463 n.l (D.C. 1999) (noting that the statutory presumption in favor of work-
relatedness is "designed to effectuate the humanitarian purposes of the statute" (quoting 
Ferreira v. Dep't of Employment Servs., 531 A.2d 651, 655 (D.C. 1987))); Four Star 
Fabricators, Inc. v. Barrett, 638 N.E.2d 792, 795 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994) (noting that the 
"humane purpose" of the Indiana workers' compensation statute requires a broad 
construction of the phrase "in the course of employment"); Bilodeau v. Oliver Stores, Inc., 
352 A.2d 741, 743 (N.H. 1976) ("A workmen's compensation law, remedial in character, is 
designed to substitute, for unsatisfactory common law remedies in tort, a liability without 
fault with limited compensation capable of ready and early determination."); Myers v. State 
Workmen's Compensation Comm'r, 239 S.E.2d 124, 126 (W. Va. 1977) (applying this 
method of interpretation to "give the claimant the benefit of all reasonable inferences"). 
But see, e.g., Philip Elecs. N. Am. v. Wright, 703 A.2d 150, 159 (Md. 1997) (arguing that 
"the legislature is the appropriate forum to balance the equity or fairness of a particular 
statutory provision in a workers' compensation scheme"); Paulson v. Danny's Market, Inc., 
No. 1998 ACO 560, XII-1121, 1998 MIWCLR (LRP) LEXIS 527, at *5 (Workers' Camp. 
App. Comm'n Sept. ll, 1998) (rejecting the "invitation" of plaintiff's counsel to "biased 
decision making in favor of her client, advocating the anti-historical contention that the 
workers' compensation act 'is remedial in nature and should be construed in a liberal and 
humanitarian manner in favor of the injured worker'"). 
79. See, e.g., Galloway v. Workers' Camp. Appeals Bd., 74 Cal. Rptr. 2d 374, 378 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 1998) ("The Labor Code and the statutes of limitation relative to that code are to 
be liberally construed in favor of the protection of employees."); Driscoll, 752 A.2d at 1075 
(noting the Connecticut Supreme Court's "judicial philosophy of construing access to 
workers' compensation benefits as broadly as the act will permit"); Bodily v. John Jump 
Trucking, Inc., 819 P.2d 1262, 1267-71 (Mont. 1991) (applying a liberal construction to 
the requirements of notice and "time definiteness" for compensation); Appeal of N.H. 
Dep't of Health and Human Serv., 761 A.2d 431, 433 (N.H. 2000) (noting that the 
remedial nature of workers' compensation statutes means that "all reasonable doubts ... 
will be liberally construed in a manner that favors the injured employee" (quoting In re 
Abbott, 653 A.2d 1113, 1115 (N.H. 1995))); Rivera v. Cosrich, Inc., 1998 N.J. Wrk. Comp. 
LEXIS 104, at *5 (N.J. Dep't of Labor Div. of Wrk. Comp. Mar. 16, 1998) ('judges are 
directed to 'liberally apply [its provisions] ... to protect employees in the event of work-
related injuries ... .'" (quoting Secor v. Penn Serv. Garage, 19 NJ. 315, 319 (1955))). 
80. Louisiana is the clearest example of this. In 1989, the Louisiana legislature 
amended the definition of "accident" in their workers' compensation statute to require an 
"unexpected or unforeseen actual, identifiable, precipitous event happening suddenly or 
violently" and which is "more than simply a gradual deterioration or progressive 
degeneration." La. R.S. 23:1021 (2000). The narrower definition of"accident" was clearly 
aimed at limiting the number of CTD claims. But the courts have continued to interpret 
"accident" liberally using the original intent of the statute. For example, one court argued 
that it was inconsistent with the purpose of the "workers' compensation scheme" to deny 
the claims of workers who were "worn down by their work rather than immediately 
1166 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 101:1140 
the legislature intended the compensation of workplace injuries to be 
adjudicated in the workers' compensation system, not the tort system.81 
But the nature of the workers' compensation "original bargain"-
and its common-law roots-has another set of related implications. First, 
because workers' compensation statutes displaced the common-law tort 
system, judges should be reluctant to construe workers' compensation 
statutes such that they do not provide an adequate substitute for the 
rights the claimant would have at common-law.82 Indeed, early in the 
history of workers' compensation jurisprudence, the Supreme Court im-
plied that there might be due process limits to the elimination of com-
mon-law tort claims.83 Secondly, this method of interpretation is familiar 
from other contemporary contexts such as judicial scrutiny of the waiver 
crippled by it." Dyson v. State Employees Group Benefits Program, 610 So. 2d 953, 956 
(La. Ct. App. 1992). 
Critics say that these judges are flouting the intent of the legislature. See Denis Paul 
Juge et al., Cumulative Trauma Disorders-"The Disease of the 90's": An Interdisciplinary 
Analysis, 55 La. L. Rev. 895, 898 (1995) ("Despite the determination of the Louisiana 
Legislature to repel the flow of cumulative trauma claims in Louisiana, the courts have 
little difficulty in molding the legislative definition of 'accident' to fit their fondness for 
CTDs."). 
81. See, e.g., Driscoll, 752 A.2d at 1076 ("[I] t is an essential part of the workers' 
compensation bargain that an employee ... relinquishes his or her potentially large 
common-law tort damages in exchange for relatively quick and certain compensation."); 
Vigliotti, 680 So. 2d at 467 ("We see nothing, however, in the extensive revisions to the 
Workers' Compensation Law to indicate the Legislature intended to broaden tort liability 
of employers in this fashion as a solution to the workers' compensation crisis."); Union 
Underwear Co. v. Scearce, 896 S.W.2d 7, 8 (Ky. 1995) ("The primary purpose of the 
workers' compensation statute is the elimination of common-law actions for personal 
injuries growing out of industrial operations."). 
82. See, e.g., Bishop v. Jaworski, 524 A.2d 1102, 1103 (R.I. 1987) ("[S]tatutes in 
derogation of the common law must be strictly constmed."); Andrade v. State, 448 A.2d 
1293, 1294 (R.I. 1982) ("The waiver of a common-law right inuring to the state, like the 
waiver of any other known right or privilege should not be lightly inferred." (citing City of 
Providence v. Solomon, 444 A.2d 870, 875 (R.l. 1982))). 
83. E.g., N.Y. Ctr. R.R. Co. v. White, 243 U.S. 188, 201 (1917) ("Nor is it necessary, for 
the purposes of the present case, to say that a State might, without violence to the 
constitutional guaranty of 'due process of law,' suddenly set aside all common-law mles 
respecting liability as between employer and employee, without providing a reasonably just 
substitute."). This was the case first upholding the constitutionality of a workers' 
compensation law in the United States. See also Epstein, supra note 19, at 794 n.50 ("The 
quid pro quo has loomed large in the American constitutional treatment of workers' 
compensation."). Since the early cases, however, the issue of constitutional limits to 
workers' compensation laws has not been addressed as frequently. But see Brady v. Safety-
Kleen Corp., 576 N.E.2d 722, 728 (Ohio 1991) (holding that an Ohio law limiting the 
common-law right of employees to bring an intentional tort claim against employers 
violated the Ohio state constitution); Martha S. Davis, Workers' Compensation Systems 
and the Takings Problem: An Essay, 38 S.D. L. Rev. 234, 271-72 (1993) (arguing that the 
"quid pro quo" of some workers' compensation systems may constitute a takings under just 
compensation analysis because of changes in the tort system). For further discussion of 
Brady, see Erika L. Haupt, Comment, Brady v. Safety-Kleen Corp.: Tipping Ohio's 
Workers' Compensation Scale in Favor of the Employee, 54 Ohio St. LJ. 837 (1993). 
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of common-law rights through private contract m the employment 
relationship. 84 
Admittedly, the original bargain lens suggested here is counterintui-
tive. Most originalist forms of interpretation look to the state of the com-
mon law at the time when the statute was enacted. In contrast, workers' 
compensation laws, as statutes that displace and supplement the common 
law, should be interpreted with reference to the current state of the com-
mon law.85 Judges do use this method of interpretation with other statu-
tory tort-like remedies that displace or supplement the common law 
under, for example, the federal environmental and civil rights laws.86 
This method of interpretation is premised on a particular under-
standing of the bargain: not as a static, one-time settlement occurring 
when the workers' compensation laws were originally passed in the early 
part of the twentieth century, but an ongoing trade-off between employ-
ees and employers-one that makes it easier to prove liability, but limits 
84. Texas courts, for example, have been considering whether employers who do not 
participate in the Texas workers' compensation system may include waivers in employee 
benefit plans that prevent employees from bringing negligence claims against their 
employer. Some courts have held that such a waiver is void and unenforceable because it 
violates public policy to allow such claims to be waived in exchange for benefits that were 
"far more limited" than those at common law or under the Texas Workers' Compensation 
Act. Controversy Over the Effect of Waivers Used by Nonsubscribers, 5 Tex. Monitor 2, 2 
(Spring 2000). The Texas Supreme Court recently ruled that such agreements are not 
clearly prohibited or clearly allowed by statute, and that a decision on whether or not they 
violate public policy was better left to the legislature. See Lawrence v. CDB Services, Inc., 
2001 Tex. LEXIS 21, at *28 (Tex. 2001). 
As compared with the review of private contracts between an employer and 
employees, a court should probably be more deferential when reviewing the adequacy of 
state workers' compensation statutes as a substitute for common-law rights. But the 
analysis is similar. 
85. Cf. Jack M. Beermann, A Critical Approach to Section 1983 with Special Attention 
to Sources of Law, 42 Stan. L. Rev. 51, 61 (1989) ("Because Congress knew that tort rules 
would evolve, one could argue, it intended that current tort principles continually replace 
the common-law of 1871 as such common-law became outdated. In that case, the Court 
would be true to congressional intent in relying on contemporary common-law principles." 
(discussing section 1983 interpretation)). 
86. Section 1983 claims and CERCLA, the Superfund law, are perhaps the best 
examples. See, e.g., Eric DeGroff, Raiders of the Lost Arco: Resolving the Partial 
Settlement Credit Issue in Private Cost Recovery and Contribution Claims Under CERCLA, 
8 N.Y.U. Envtl. LJ. 332, 371 (2000) ("The courts have recognized, in CERCLA's legislative 
history, that Congress expected them to look to common law principles in addressing 
liability issues left unresolved by the statute itself."); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Public Values 
in Statutory Interpretation, 137 U. Pa. L. Rev. I007, 1052 (1989) (noting that "federal 
courts routinely look to the common law, which often serves as a presumptive starting 
place for interpretation" when filling gaps in broadly-worded statutes like§ I983); Michael 
Wells, Constitutional Remedies, Section 1983 and the Common Law, 68 Miss. LJ. 157, I58 
( 1998) ("Since section 1983 does not provide answers to the remedial questions that arise 
in tort suits, the Supreme Court has looked to the common law in resolving them."). 
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the amount of damages.87 In essence, every current worker, by participat-
ing in the workers' compensation system, is trading his common-law right 
to sue for tort for the swift but limited remedy of workers' compensation. 
Indeed, the idea of worker choice of remedy is still incorporated into 
other areas of workers' compensation laws.88 
The implication of this understanding of the bargain is clear: Work-
ers' compensation jurisprudence must keep pace with developments in 
common-law tortjurisprudence such that it remains easier to prove com-
pensability in workers' compensation than in the tort system.89 When 
workers' compensation laws were first passed, the mechanism for achiev-
ing easier compensability was to remove the requirement that plaintiffs 
prove fault. But, as demonstrated in Part II, this may no longer be the 
advantage it once was. In fact, contemporary developments in tort law, 
particularly the ability to use ergonomic evidence to demonstrate negli-
gence and causation, can put CTD claimants at a distinct disadvantage 
under workers' compensation compared to tort law. If common-law juris-
prudence recognizes new methods of scientific evidence, such as epide-
miology or ergonomics, as legitimate ways of allowing inferences of causa-
tion, then workers' compensation judges should follow suit.90 Otherwise, 
87. For another articulation of this concept, see Note, Exceptions to the Exclusive 
Remedy Requirements of Workers' Compensation Statutes, 96 Harv. L. Rev. 1641, 1656-57 
(1983). This author writes: 
It is wrong to view the compensation system as a static bargain impervious to 
societal change. Such a view would dictate that ... as the tort system improved, 
workers would be increasingly disadvantaged by a deal originally designed for 
their benefit. Instead, the bargain must be recalibrated to reflect the changes in 
the realities of the tort system and the workplace that have made the terms of the 
original trade off unacceptable. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
88. For example, workers have the ability to "elect" to pursue workers' compensation 
claims or a tort claim against a third party such as a manufacturer who may have made a 
defective product that caused the injury. Arthur Larson & Lex K. Larson, 6 Larson's 
Workers' Compensation Law, §102-18 to 102-27 (2000). 
89. FELA jurisprudence, particularly as explained hy the Supreme Court in recent 
years, has followed this model of looking to common-law developments. See Consol. Rail 
Corp. v. Gottshall, 512 U.S. 532, 557 (1994) ("Our FELA cases require that we look to the 
common law when considering the right to recover asserted by respondents."); Atchison, 
Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Buell, 480 U.S. 557, 568 (1987) (assuming that "FELA 
jurisprudence gleans guidance from common-law developments"). As the Third Circuit 
observed in its treatment of the Gottshall case, one consideration into whether the plaintiff 
has a right to recovery is whether he has a "solid basis in the present state of common-law 
to permit him to recover." Gottshall v. Consol. Rail Corp., 988 F.2d 355, 371 (quoted in 
Gottshall, 512 U.S. at 563 (Ginsburg,]., dissenting)). 
90. The justification used by the Supreme Court in a FELA case more than forty years 
ago is equally applicable to workers' compensation jurisprudence today. In Kernan v. Am. 
Dredging Co., the Court held that: 
[I]nstead of a detailed statute codifYing common-law principles, Congress saw fit 
to enact a statute of the most general terms, thus leaving in large measure to the 
courts the duty of fashioning remedies for injured employees in a manner 
analogous to the development of tort remedies at common law. But it is clear 
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both employees and employers-depending on the case and the issue-
could face disadvantages under workers' compensation in ways that stray 
from the original bargain of guaranteed compensability but limited 
damages.91 
An example of how judges can use the "original bargain" lens helps 
illustrate a way out of this dilemma. In jurisdictions that have raised the 
procedural burden of proof for certain injuries to "clear and convincing 
evidence," courts are likely to face the question of whether uncontra-
dicted, credible medical testimony about the possibility that work activi-
ties caused the claimant's injury, combined with credible evidence and 
testimony from the claimant about his work activities, is sufficient for the 
claimant to carry his burden of proof. The answer is not evident from the 
statutory language alone. Because of the heightened burden of proof, 
and the common-law requirement in most jurisdictions that medical testi-
mony indicate a "probability" of work-relatedness, many jurisdictions may 
be reluctant to grant benefits under this scenario. 
The "original bargain" lens sheds light on how to resolve this ques-
tion. Recognizing that the original bargain was intended to provide 
that the general congressional intent was to provide liberal recovery for injured 
workers, and it is also clear that Congress intended the creation of no static 
remedy, but one which would be developed and enlarged to meet changing 
conditions and changing concepts of industry's duty toward its workers. 
355 U.S. 426, 432 (1958) (quoted in Gottshall, 512 U.S. at 559 (Souter,]., concurring)). 
91. Professor Samuel Estreicher, among others, has pointed out the conundrum: 
The statutes reflected a compromise: the employee was assured a fairly certain 
recovery, but had to forfeit any civil action and the chance, however unlikely, of 
obtaining more from a jury. Over time, however, the common law restrictions 
were swept away, life and limb received higher valuation, and juries became 
exceptionally generous .... What had been an unmistakable advance for workers 
became an anomaly: a source of injustice to employees who are treated less 
favorably than others suffering similar injuries outside of the employment 
context. 
Samuel Estreicher,Judicial Nullification: Guido Calabresi's Uncommon Common Law for 
a Statutory Age, 57 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1126, 1134 (1982); see also John G. Culhane, The 
Emperor Has No Causation: Exposing a judicial Misconstruction of Science, 2 Widener L. 
Symp.J. 185, 203 n.98 (1997) (arguing for a "liberal" approach to determining whether an 
illness or injury was work-related based on the idea that in the workers' compensation 
bargain, the plaintiff "buys" insurance against injury on the job in exchange for giving up 
the right to sue in tort). 
Critics of this approach might take a different view of the "original bargain." Some 
might say that the original bargain only covered industrial accidents, not occupational 
disease or gradual injuries occurring from the normal course of work. See, e.g., Morris v. 
Morris, 385 S.E.2d 858, 862 (Va. 1989) (arguing that the original intent of the Virginia 
Workers' Compensation Act, adopted in 1918, was to provide compensation for "the most 
frequently recurring kinds of industrial accidents" and denying compensation for gradual 
injuries). According to this view, any modifications to this bargain must be made explicitly 
through legislation. Cf. Richard A. Epstein, A Common Law for Labor Relations: A 
Critique of the New Deal Labor Legislation, 92 Yale LJ. 1357, 1358 (1983) (using 
traditional common-law principles as the appropriate "benchmark" against which to judge 
"modern statutory schemes"). 
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greater certainty of recovery to employees, while limiting the amount of 
recovery, judges should assume that the legislature could not have in-
tended to make it more difficult for claimants with legitimate, work-re-
lated injuries to prove compensability. The higher burden of proof is 
ostensibly designed to prevent fraudulent claims, not deny legitimate 
ones. lf the judge is convinced that the injury was work-related, then she 
must award benefits. However, current workers' compensation jurispru-
dence about the requirements of medical causation and the ability to 
draw inferences about causation may make such an award difficult.92 
The claim here is not that legislatures lack the authority to change 
procedural burdens of proof and substantive burdens of causation, or 
that interpretation of workers' compensation laws must march in lockstep 
with every development in the common law. The claim is that judges 
have an obligation to interpret workers' compensation statutes in light of 
the "original bargain" when deciding close questions of common-law or 
statutory interpretation. This obligation comes from the dual imperative 
to interpret statutes in light of their "purpose" so as to avoid unreasona-
ble results, and to avoid eliminating common-law remedies without rec-
ognizing the substitute provided by statute. The "original bargain" lens 
should not be determinative in every case, but it should be an influential 
perspective for workers' compensation judges deciding close cases-par-
ticularly in the context of new challenges to the workers' compensation 
system like .cumulative trauma disorders. 
B. Exploiting the Probative Value of Ergonomic Evidence 
Ergonomics offers a potential way out of the conundrum for work-
ers' compensation judges trying to obey the statutory requirement that 
the claimant prove work-relatedness, while fulfilling the original bargain 
of quick but limited compensation for legitimate work-related injuries. 
By demonstrating the risk factors present in a particular workplace, ergo-
nomic evidence can allow a fact-finder to infer that work activities caused 
the injury. Crediting such evidence would require a greater receptivity to 
inferences than many workers' compensation judges have demonstrated, 
but these kinds of inferences are frequently allowed in common-law tort 
claims, in occupational disease claims, and even by some workers' com-
pensation judges facing CTD claimants.93 
As the common-law tort and FEIA cases demonstrate, ergonomic ev-
idence can give rise to an inference of causation in CTD cases. Indeed, 
ergonomics can play a critical role in both prongs of the legal and medi-
cal causation inquiry under workers' compensation. For medical causa-
tion, testimony from a doctor or ergonomist regarding the presence of 
risk factors in a claimant's work activities that are known to cause CTDs 
can give rise to an inference that the work activity was "in fact" a substan-
92. See supra Part II.A.-B. 
93. See supra Part II.B. I. 
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tial factor in causing the injury.94 1n determining legal causation, the 
equivalent of the "proximate cause" or foreseeability inquiry, the claim-
ant can present evidence that the employer either knew that the claim-
ant's work activities were likely to cause CTDs based on the existence of 
an in-house ergonomic program,95 or should have known based on in-
dustry norms96 or government standards.97 Such inferences, increasingly 
common with the acceptance of ergonomics in common-law tort jurispru-
dence, are equally permissible and necessary in workers' compensation 
cases. 
The potential role of ergonomics in determining the compensability 
of CTDs is analogous to that of epidemiology in assessing claims of occu-
pational disease from toxic chemical exposure. Like CTDs, occupational 
diseases from toxic chemical exposure develop gradually, often take time 
to manifest themselves, and rarely offer visible signs of the causative 
agent. By comparing levels of disease among the population exposed to 
the toxic substance to a corresponding control group, epidemiological 
evidence otTers a way to demonstrate to the fact-finder that it is more 
94. See, e.g., id. (discussing Aparicio v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co., 84 F.3d 803 (6th Cir. 
1996)); Aetna Life & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Commonwealth, 737 N.E.2d 880, 883-84 (Mass. App. 
Ct. 2000) (noting administrative law judge's finding that "sitting in one position for 
extended periods of time against the advice of his doctor, doing the work of a decreasing 
staff, in an ergonomically inappropriate chair, and for over the period of a year" indicated 
that the injury was more than "mere wear and tear"). 
95. See, e.g., Mosley v. Excel Corp., 109 F.3d 1006, 1015-16 (5th Cir. 1997) (Parker, 
J., dissenting) (pointing to significant evidence of foreseeability, including evidence of 
high injury rates which had been reported to Excel, and Excel's rejection of its own 
ergonomics expert's recommendation of rest pauses). 
96. See, e.g., Norfolk & W. Ry. v. Johnson, 465 S.E.2d 800, 805-06 (Va. 1996) 
(affirming jury verdict that defendant had actual or constructive knowledge of both 
industry and medical opinion regarding the relationship between grinder vibration and 
carpal tunnel syndrome); Eaton v. Quincy, No. 89 WC 12084, 1999 Ill. Wrk. Comp. LEXIS 
44, at *24 (Indus. Comm'n of Ill. May 28, 1999) (Kinnaman, J., dissenting) (fire chief 
testified that he was aware of the general problem of hearing loss and firefighters from 
reading trade magazines). In johnson, the Virginia Supreme Court summarized the 
ergonomics expert's testimony on this issue as follows: 
Shinnick testified that industry had established methods to prevent occupational 
carpal tunnel syndrome. These include making an analysis of the tools used and 
performing an ergonomics study. If the study identifies hazards at the work site, 
prevention and control is employed, which should include redesigning the tools, 
redesigning the methods used in performing the work, use of protective 
equipment ... , medical tracking of workers, and training and education of 
employees. 
ld. at 804. 
97. With the promulgation of ergonomic standards on the federal and state levels, 
evidence of violations of such standards could be used to support an inference that the 
claimant's injury was caused by work. The existence of best-practice guidelines for 
particular industries can serve a similar function. See Gutierrez v. Excel Corp., 106 F.3d 
683, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 12984, at *3-*4 (5th Cir. 1997) (noting OSHA guidelines for 
preventing CTDs, including increasing the number of workers performing a task, 
designing jobs to allow self-pacing when feasible, implementing job rotation, and 
designing jobs to allow sufficient rest pauses). 
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likely than not that exposure to the toxic substance caused the harm.98 
Although there has been controversy surrounding the use of epidemio-
logical evidence, its acceptance has grown as judges and commentators 
have recognized that it is often the only credible means of presenting 
evidence on causation of occupational diseases.99 
Like epidemiological evidence in occupational disease cases, ergo-
nomic evidence can be used to convince workers' compensation judges 
that CTDs are work-related.100 Ergonomic studies can show that work-
places with job rotation, tasks that are performed differently, or increased 
numbers of workers can have lower rates of CTDs. And specific, job-
based ergonomic assessments can demonstrate that the particular claim-
ant's work could have been done differently, with a decreased risk of de-
veloping a CTD. This kind of evidence-like epidemiological evidence-
can give rise to an inference that the work activity caused the injury. 
Allowing these kinds of inferences enables those adjudicating work-
ers' compensation claims to take advantage of new scientific techniques 
in order to make more accurate determinations of what injuries or ill-
nesses should be compensable. This approach is also consistent with the 
98. See, e.g., Steve Gold, Note, Causation in Toxic Torts: Burdens of Proof, Standards 
of Persuasion, and Statistical Evidence, 96 Yale LJ. 376, 380 (1986) ("Toxic tort 
litigation . . . involves inferences on causation derived from group-based information, 
rather than specific conclusions regarding causation in the individual case." (footnotes 
omitted)); Melissa Moore Thompson, Comment, Causal Inference in Epidemiology: 
Implications for Toxic Tort Litigation, 7I N.C. L. Rev. 247, 274-78 (1992) (discussing the 
use of "epidemiology to establish legal cause"). 
99. See, e.g., Jack B. Weinstein, Preliminary Reflections on the Law's Reaction to 
Disasters, 11 Colum. J. Envtl. L. 1, 10 n.24 (1986) (noting that specific causal chains are 
not identifiable in toxic torts); Developments in the Law-Toxic Waste Litigation, 99 Harv. 
L. Rev. 1458, 1603 (1986) (discussing the problem that "the ambiguous etiology of many 
diseases associated with exposure to toxic substances and the long latency periods ... 
create serious doctrinal and practical problems for the toxic waste victim seeking 
recovery"); Michael Dore, Comment, A Proposed Standard For Evaluating the Use of 
Epidemiological Evidence in Toxic Tort and other Personal Injury Cases, 28 How. LJ. 677, 
692-93 (1985) (arguing against the use of epidemiology, but acknowledging its likely 
continued use because of the difficulty in developing direct proof in toxic tort and similar 
cases); Gold, supra note 98, at 379-80 (discussing the use of epidemiological evidence in 
toxic tort cases). 
IOO. Like epidemiology, testimony from people with expertise in ergonomics is not 
always admitted under the Supreme Court's Daubert standard or given much credence 
because of the relative novelty of the discipline. But this is increasingly rare. See, e.g., 
Stasior v. Nat'! R.R. Passenger Corp., I9 F. Supp. 2d 835, 847-5I (N.D. Ill. I998) 
(excluding ergonomists' testimony on foreseeability and causation as scientifically 
unreliable under the Daubert standard). But see Ingram v. Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 
Local 202I, No. 97-6091, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 17825, at *I3 (lOth Cir. 1998) (upholding 
the decision to deny disability benefits based in part on the report of an ergonomics 
engineer); Rodney v. Michelin Tire Corp., 466 S.E.2d 357, 359 (S.C. 1996) (crediting 
testimony by ergonomist that the probability of developing carpal tunnel syndrome is 
relatively low for person in claimant's position); Eaton, I999 Ill. Wrk. Comp. LEX IS 44, at 
*20-*22 (relying in part on testimony of industrial hygienist, performing function similar 
to ergonomics expert). 
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original bargain because it takes account of common-law developments 
in how causation can be proven, and provides greater certainty for the 
compensability of legitimate, work-related CTDs. 
C. Shifting the Bargain Towards Emplayers in CTD Cases 
In order to uphold the original bargain for CTDs, workers' compen-
sation judges should employ a burden-shifting framework on the issue of 
"work-relatedness" analogous to that used for Title VII claims. Under this 
proposal, which could be employed by judges as a matter of common law, 
the claimant would have the burden of establishing a prima facie case 
that the injury or illness was work-related. This could be established with 
medical or ergonomic testimony that there is a substantial possibility that 
the injury is work-related, along with credible testimony from the claim-
ant. Judges should explicitly take into account the difficulty in proving 
medical causation thusallowing the claimant to use inferences and cir-
cumstantial evidence. Because of the nature of CTDs, undisputed medi-
cal opinions on causation are entitled to particular deference, regardless 
of the presence of "objective medical findings." 101 
Establishing a prima facie 'case would create a rebuttable presump-
tion that the injury was work-related. The burden would then shift to the 
employer to prove that the injury was not related to the claimant's work 
activities. Besides introducing evidence of non-work causes, the employer 
could then present evidence of ergonomic improvements already made 
in the workplace,102 before the injury occurred, shifting the burden back 
101. See, e.g., Brandt v. Leon Plastics, Inc., 483 N.W.2d 523, 526 (Neb. 1992) (White, 
J., dissenting) ("Though judges generally lack the skill and training to competently 
diagnose the etiology of subjective injuries and disabilities, the majority is determined to 
anoint them with the power to evaluate the accuracy of uncontroverted opinions rendered 
by those who are so trained."); Blaser v. Country Club of Beloit, Claim No. 1996052288, 
1998 WI Wrk. Comp. LEXIS 243, at *3 (Wis. Labor & Indus. Review Comm'njuly 29, 1998) 
("[S]ome consideration must be given to the special knowledge and role of a medical 
expert in addressing what is essentially a question of medical expertise."); Workers' 
Compensation, 76 Tex. Jur. §735 (3rd ed. 2000) ("Where causation of a condition is 
peculiarly within the realm of scientific medical knowledge, the trier of fact is not 
authorized to make a finding contrary to that made by medical experts, even if merely one 
such witness testifies."). But this approach has its pitfalls, as the increased use of 
"independent medical examiners" has shown. See, e.g., Blaser, 1998 WI Wrk. Comp. 
LEXIS 243, at *31 (determining that the independent medical examiner's opinion that the 
applicant suffered from "borderline diabetes," in the absence of any evidence supporting 
such a diagnosis, "damages his credibility" and raises doubt about whether he objectively 
evaluated the applicant "without an underlying agenda"). 
102. Currently, courts often note evidence of ergonomic improvements. See, e.g., 
Chrysler Corp. v. Nolan, 1996 Del. Super. LEXIS 464, at *4 (Del. Super. Ct. 1996) (noting 
that Chrysler had performed two ergonomic assessments of the claimant's job to 
determine whether it would cause physical problems); Hormel & Co. v. Jordan, 569 
N.W.2d 148, 153 (Iowa 1997) (finding that the "plant manager accommodated [claimant] 
by assigning tasks that limited strenuous overhead lifting and pushing of heavy tubs"); 
Barrilleaux v. Dryades Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 653 So. 2d 690, 691 (La. Ct. App. 1995) (noting 
that claimant's supervisor rearranged file boxes so that claimant could access them without 
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to the claimant. This burden-shifting approach would bring workers' 
compensation systems closer to the original vision of efficient compen-
sability of legitimate claims.103 
Indeed, there are existing examples of burden-shifting schemes in 
workers' compensation law-either written into the statute or created by 
common law. 104 The District of Columbia's workers' compensation stat-
ute, for example, contains a presumption of work-relatedness for all 
claims. 105 Courts have held that to invoke the presumption, a claimant 
lifting); In re Comp. of Randy C. Ferland, WCB Case No. 97-08315, 1999 Or. Wrk. Comp. 
LEXIS 218, at *2 (Or. Wrk. Comp Bd. Mar. 12, 1999) ("During the time claimant installed 
parts, the employer improved some of the tasks ergonomically."). 
103. This proposal is limited to the treatment ofCTDs: The consideration of whether 
it should be extended to all injuries and occupational diseases is beyond the scope of this 
Note. 
Currently, there are different statutory and common-law rules surrounding the 
treatment of different types of workers' compensation claims-particularly between 
injuries and occupational diseases, but also specific burdens of proof and evidentiary 
standards for heart disease, work-related stress, and emotional trauma. Some jurisdictions 
have alluded to the need for special rules governing CTDs. See, e.g., Alcan Foil Prod. v. 
Huff, 2 S.W.3d 96, 100 (Ky. 1999) ("Despite the number of gradual injury claims and the 
difficulties encountered in attempting to apply [notice and statute of limitations 
requirements] to those claims, the legislature has not chosen to create special rules to 
govern the period of limitations for claims for gradual injury such as exist for occupational 
disease."). 
104. See, e.g., Clark v. Excel Corp., W.C. No. 4-347-891, 1999 Colo. Wrk. Comp. 
LEXIS 146, at *3 (Colo. Indus. Qaim App. Office June 23, 1999) (applying judicially-
created rule that "once the claimant establishes that a particular [occupational] disease is 
to some degree caused, aggravated, or accelerated by occupational hazards, the burden of 
apportioning disability to non-occupational causes shifts to the respondents"); Mulvihill v. 
Stormont-Vail Reg'! Med. Ctr., No. 216,062, 1998 KS Wrk. Comp. LEXIS 670, at *5-*6 
(Kan. Div. Of Workers' Comp. July 1998), available at ftp:/ /ftp.hr.state.ks.us/wc/wp (file 
named 216062.x) (last visited Feb. 28, 2001) (implicitly shifting the burden to the 
employer by saying that claimant presented evidence that her symptoms arose from work 
activity of pushing laundry carts, and then noting that "no evidence has been presented to 
show claimant's pain originated from any other source"); Rivera v. Cosrich, Inc., 1998 NJ. 
Wrk. Comp. LEXIS 104, at *8 (shifting the burden of proof to exonerate or mitigate 
liability to the employer after the employee meets her burden of proof on causation). 
105. It states that any claim for compensation "shall be presumed, in the absence of 
evidence to the contrary: (1) [To come] within the provisions of this chapter." D.C. Code 
Ann. § 36-321(1) (1981). A few other jurisdictions have used a presumption of work-
relatedness, thereby leaving it to the employer to disprove any causal connection between 
the employment and the disability. See, e.g., Peirce & Dworkin, supra note 21, at 678 
(citing New York, Pennsylvania and Florida); cf. Dir., Office of Workers' Comp. Programs 
v. Greenwich Collieries, 512 U.S. 267, 280 (1994) ("In part due to Congress' recognition 
that claims such as those involved [under the Longshore and Harbor Workers' 
Compensation Act and the Black Lung Benefits Act] would be difficult to prove, claimants 
in adjudications under these statutes benefit from certain statutory presumptions easing 
their burden."). 
One commentator explained such a presumption as a way of dealing with problems 
of proof: 
The presumption of compensability for specified cumulative injuries or diseases 
recognizes (1) that a generalized causative link exist~ between the injury or 
disease and the workplace and (2) that such a causative link will be difficult to 
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need only present some evidence of an injury, and a work-related event 
which has the potential to result in or contribute to the injury. 106 Once 
the presumption is triggered, the burden shifts to the employer to pro-
duce substantial evidence that the disability was not work-related. 107 Ten-
nessee also has a workers' compensation approach, formulated by judges 
through common law, that takes account of medical realities. In Tennes-
see, a doctor's testimony that work activities "could be" the cause of the 
injury establishes a prima facie case that, combined with the testimony of 
the claimant, can be enough to support an award of benefits in the ab-
sence of contrary evidence from the employer. 108 
This proposal has the benefit of taking full advantage of the poten-
tial of ergonomics to demonstrate work-relatedness, as epidemiological 
evidence has done in occupational disease cases. It takes account of the 
medical uncertainty surrounding cumulative trauma disorders in a way 
that places the cost of such uncertainty on the employer, not the em-
ployee, for reasons familiar from tort theory: The employer is the cheap-
est cost avoider and insurer, and is best able to spread costs. The pro-
posed burden-shifting framework would also be more faithful to the 
fundamental nature of the "original bargain," by recognizing a wider 
range of claims as compensable but limiting individual compensation 
amounts. 
This proposed scheme rests on acknowledging medical realities and 
limitations, just as the Title VII burden-shifting scheme is built on recog-
nizing the realities of the workplace. 109 As in workers' compensation stat-
prove. The link is therefore presumed, and the worker compensated, so long as 
the illness or disease is one that is classified by the workers' compensation system 
as work-related. 
Joseph LaDou, M.D. et a!., Cumulative Injury or Disease Claims: An Attempt to Define 
Employers' Liability for Workers' Compensation, 6 Am. J.L. & Med. 1, 21 (1980). 
106. See, e.g., King v. D.C. Dep't of Employment Servs., 742 A.2d 460, 469 (D.C. 
1999) (stating that the rebuttable presumption of coverage may be invoked by a claimant 
who presents some evidence of "a death or disability and ... a work-related event which has 
the potential to result in or contribute to the death or disability"); Hill v. Father Flanagan's 
Boys' Town, No. 99-318, 1999 D.C. Wrk. Comp. LEXIS 481, at *8 (D.C. Office of 
Employment Servs. Dec. 30, 1999) (citing Spartin v. D.C. Dep't of Employment Servs., 584 
A.2d 564 (D.C. 1990)). 
107. See King, 742 A.2d at 470 (citing Brown v. D.C. Dep't of Employment Servs., 700 
A.2d 787, 791 (D.C. 1997)). 
108. See Tenn. Prot. & Advocacy, Inc. v. Greene, 2000 Tenn. LEXIS 589, at *11 
(Tenn. Oct. 24, 2000) Uustifying rule on the basis that "medical witnesses are rarely, if ever, 
able to state their opinions on medical causation with reasonable certainty"). 
109. As Justice Souter has pointed out in the workers' compensation context, "the 
issue of who bears the risk of nonpersuasion raises a traditional 'question of policy and 
fairness based on experience in ... different situations."' Greenwich Collieries, 512 U.S. at 
295 (Souter, J., dissenting) (quoting Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, Denver, 413 U.S. 189, 209 
(1973)). Indeed, taking account of the realities of the modern-day workplace, as well as 
medical realities, is a well-established technique of interpretation. See, e.g., Nelson v. 
Metro-North Commuter R.R., 235 F.3d 101, 111 (2d Cir. 2001) (ruling that placing "such a 
temporal restriction" on recovery for emotional injury tied to physical harm might be 
1176 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 101:1140 
utes, the burden of proof in a Title VII case always remains with the plain-
tif£.110 Within this context, however, the Supreme Court in Title VII cases 
has outlined a framework where the burden of production shifts between 
plaintiff and defendant during the course of a trial. The Title VII bur-
den-shifting scheme allows plaintiffs to prove a prima facie case through 
circumstantial evidence because of the difficulty of procuring direct evi-
dence of employment discrimination, and allows factfinders to draw in-
ferences based on commonly held beliefs about how employers make de-
cisions.111 Similarly, the burden-shifting framework proposed in this 
"incongruous in light of the realities of the modern-day workplace, where exposure to 
toxic substances that create injury or disease in the future is a major cause of work-related 
illness and death"). 
110. See Greenwich Collieries, 512 U.S. at 272-80 for an extended discussion of the 
history and ambiguity behind the term "burden of proof." Indeed, in Title VII 
jurisprudence, the Supreme Court has used "burden of proof' to refer to "burden of 
production." See Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 660 (1989) ("[T]o the 
extent that those cases speak of an employer's 'burden of proof with respect to a 
legitimate business justification defense ... they should have been understood to mean an 
employer's production-but not persuasion-burden."). 
111. E.g., Robert Belton, Causation and Burden-Shifting Doctrines in Employment 
Discrimination Law Revisited: Some Thoughts on Hopkins and Wards Cove, 64 Tul. L. 
Rev. 1359, 1364-83 (1990) (describing burden-shifting scheme adopted by the Court in 
Title VII context); Norma G. White, Note, St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks: The Title VII 
Shifting Burden Stays Put, 25 Loy. U. Chi. LJ. 269, 300-01 (1994) (same). For other 
examples of burden-shifting frameworks, see NLRB v. Transp. Mgmt. Corp., 462 U.S. 393, 
401-03 (1983) (upholding the burden-shifting approach used by the NLRB in "dual 
motive" cases to determine whether an employee was fired because of antiunion animus on 
the part of the employer); Berry v. Schweiker, 675 F.2d 464, 467 (2d Cir. I982) (explaining 
the burden-shifting framework for Social Security disability benefits cases). The NLRB 
approach is analogous both to the Title VII mixed-motive cases, and to the approach 
proposed here for CTD workers' compensation cases: The employee would have the 
burden of producing evidence that work activities contributed to the injury, and the 
employer would have the opportunity to persuade the ALJ that the employee would have 
developed the injury even in the absence of contributing work activities. 
The NLRB approach is also an example of administrative agencies using their 
specialized knowledge to draw inferences when applying established law to the facts of a 
case when adjudicating a claim. Similarly, workers' compensation judges also take account 
of workplace realities on occasion. See, e.g., Venenga v. John Deere Component Works, 
498 N.W.2d 422, 425 (Iowa Ct. App. 1993) (interpreting the "notice" requirement liberally 
because the court concluded that it "cannot ignore [the fact] that informing an employer 
of a work-related il~ury creates tension between the employee and the employer"); 
Guilbeaux v. Martin Mills, Inc., 640 So. 2d 472, 476 (La. Ct. App. 1994) (interpreting the 
"notice" requirement liberally on the grounds that neither the claimant nor any other 
worker should be "penalized for trying to work as much as he or she can, despite the 
pain"); Weise v. Becton-Dickinson Co., 4 Neb. Ct. App. 700, I993 Neb. LEXIS 367, at *22 
(I993) (specifYing that in determining the "reasonableness of the time interval" between 
the onset of symptoms and interruption of employment, the ALJ should consider "any 
economic, family, or personal circumstances compelling [the claimant] to continue 
working in spite of her condition"); Clark v. Excel Corp., No. 4-347-891, 1999 Colo. Wrk. 
Comp. LEXIS I46, at *5-*6 (Colo. Indus. Claim App. Office June 23, 1999) (ordering a 
change in the treating physician because of physician's "close working and business 
relationship" with employer). But see Jiminez v. Schott Bros. Co., No. 93-030267, 1998 NJ. 
Wrk. Comp. LEXIS 90, at *40 (NJ Div. Of Workers' Comp. Sept. IO, 1998) (denying claim 
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Note is based on the premise that there is rarely direct evidence of causa-
tion for CTDs because of their gradual, invisible nature. 
Some might argue that this proposed burden-shifting approach 
would simply turn a workers' compensation hearing that would now be a 
"battle of the dueling doctors" into a battle of the dueling ergonomists. 
This change, however, would be a welcome development for both policy 
and institutional reasons. With the current system's focus on medical 
causation, workers' compensation disputes often turn on technical and 
uncertain medical questions, providing little incentive for employers to 
act to prevent injuries. 112 In contrast, disputes over how best to design 
healthy workplaces create powerful incentives for employers to pay close 
attention to ergonomics. Employers will be on notice that attention to 
injury prevention will count in their favor, while a lack of attention to 
ergonomics can be used to hold them responsible under workers' com-
pensation. Further, from an institutional competence perspective,judges 
are simply better equipped to evaluate steps that employers could have 
taken in the workplace than they are to evaluate competing medical opin-
ions on what caused a complex type of injury. 
D. Reviving the Exclusive Remedy Doctrine 
The lack of compensation for CTDs might not be a problem if work-
ers could bring tort actions for injuries outside the scope of the workers' 
compensation system. Under the "exclusive remedy" doctrine, employees 
who get workers' compensation for a particular injury or illness cannot 
also recover in tort. 11 ~ But by the same token, if a workers' compensation 
judge decides that a particular claim is not covered under workers' com-
pensation, then the claimant should be able to bring a cause of action 
under tort law. 114 Traditionally, in cases that were categorically excluded 
from workers' compensation, the tort remedy remained open. Thus, 
that workplace caused stress disorder based in part on ALJ's observation that the claimant 
kept returning to the same job for nineteen years, without acknowledging that she was an 
immigrant with limited education and skills who one psychologist called "borderline, 
mildly retarded"). 
ll2. There is already a financial incentive for employers because workers' 
compensation insurance is experience-rated, which means that the premium charged 
depends on the level of benefit payments. But the empirical evidence regarding the 
success of experience rating as a prevention tool is mixed. See Terry Thomason et al., 
Workers' Compensation: Benefits, Costs, and Safety Under Alternative Insurance 
Arrangements II (2000). 
113. See, for example, Larson & Larson, supra note 88, § 100, for an overview of the 
nature and the scope of the "exclusive remedy" doctrine. 
ll4. See Boggs v. Blue Diamond Coal Co., 590 F.2d 655, 660 (6th Cir. 1979) 
(approaching the case from the perspective that "'every presumption should be on the 
side of preserving' common law rights in the absence of 'compelling statutory language or 
social policy justification'" (quoting Arthur Larson, The Law of Workmen's Compensation 
14-95 (1976))). 
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most cases on the fringes of workers' compensation jurisdiction involved 
the employers arguing for compensability under workers' compensation. 115 
But many states, judicially and legislatively, are increasingly interpret-
ing the "exclusive remedy" doctrine to mean that no tort action can be 
brought based on an injury or illness occurring in the workplace-even if 
it is not covered under the terms of the workers' compensation statute. 11 fi 
In fact, several states have recently passed new laws barring virtually any 
tort actions for workplace injury. 117 This is a clear violation of the origi-
nal bargain-trading away the common-law tort right in exchange for no 
right to recovery at all. 118 
Properly understood with reference to the original bargain, the "ex-
clusive remedy" doctrine should operate as a self-correcting mechanism 
to insure that the workers' compensation system keeps pace with the 
common law in tort. If CTDs, for example, are not compensable under 
115. See, e.g., Foley v. Honeywell, Inc., 488 N.W.2d 268, 270 (Minn. 1992) (agreeing 
with employer that assault and murder on employee walking to her car after leaving the 
office arose out of her employment); Johns-Manville Prods. Corp. v. Superior Court of 
Contra Costa County, 6I2 P.2d 948, 951 (Cal. 1980) (rejecting employer's argument that 
plaintiff's application for workers' compensation benefits precluded recovery in tort). 
1 I6. Note, Exceptions to the Exclusive Remedy Requirements of Workers' 
Compensation Statutes, 96 Harv. L. Rev. I64I, 1654 (1983) [hereinafter Exceptions] 
("UJudicial reluctance to adopt exceptions to the exclusive remedy rule has stemmed from 
an unwillingness to tamper with what courts see as the fixed terms of the carefully designed 
legislative bargain underlying workers' compensation."). For a recent counterexample, 
see Adams v. Alliant Techsystems, Inc., 544 S.E. 2d 354, 2001 Va. LEXIS 57, at *9 (Va. 
2001) ("To the extent that the field is not touched by the statute, we think that the 
legislature intended that the employee's common-law remedies against his employer are to 
be preserved unimpaired."). 
117. Martha T. McCluskey, The Illusion of Efficiency in Workers' Compensation 
"Reform," 50 Rutgers L. Rev. 657, 790 (1998). A few cases in the early 1980s allowed tort 
actions for occupational diseases to be brought against employers outside the workers' 
compensation system on the ground that the injuries were intentionally inflicted. See, e.g., 
johns-Manville, 612 P.2d at 950 (holding that fraudulent concealment by an employer of 
worker's condition and its work-related cause was an intentional tort not covered by 
"exclusive remedy provisions"); Blankenship v. Cincinnati Milacron Chems., Inc., 433 
N.E.2d 572, 576 (Ohio I982) (holding that intentional failure to correct or warn about 
dangerous conditions was not an "injury" and thus not covered by "exclusive remedy 
provisions"); see also Richard A. Epstein, The Historical Origins and Economic Structure 
of Workers' Compensation Law, 16 Ga. L. Rev. 775, 8I4-15 (1982) (arguing that direct 
tort actions such as those permitted in Blankenship and johns-Manville should be rejected 
under "exclusive remedy" provisions). Some states have written this "intentional tort" 
exception into statute. 
118. Professor Larson's treatise argues: 
If ... the exclusiveness defense is a 'part of the quid pro quo by which the sacrifices 
and gains of employees and employers are to some extent put in balance,' it 
ought logically to follow that the employer should be spared damage liability only 
when compensation liability has actually been provided in its place, or, to state 
the matter from the employee's point of view, rights of action for damages should 
not be deemed taken away except when something of value has been put in their 
place. 
Larson & Larson, supra note 88, § 100-22. 
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workers' compensation, then workers should be able to bring a tort 
claim-without being barred by the "exclusive remedy" doctrine. 119 lf 
employers begin facing increasing liability under tort from injuries or ill-
nesses occurring in the workplace, then they will no doubt pressure state 
legislatures to explicitly cover such claims under the terms of the workers' 
compensation statutes. 120 This precise chain of events occurred in the 
past with occupational diseases and is unfolding today, increasingly, with 
psychological injuries. 121 ln the context of cumulative trauma disorders, 
however, improper application of the "exclusive remedy" doctrine has, in 
addition to leaving workers without a remedy, disabled the system's mech-
anism for evolution and self-correction. 
CoNCLUSION 
The original bargain of workers' compensation was premised on the 
assumptions that for work-related injuries, causation was relatively easy to 
prove, and that removing the fault requirement eliminated the biggest 
obstacle to compensability for plaintiffs. For the paradigmatic industrial 
accident, this premise was no doubt true. But for cumulative trauma dis-
orders, causation can be quite difficult to prove, especially since workers' 
compensation jurisprudence emphasizes medical causation. 
Workers' compensation judges should not hesitate to use the new 
science of ergonomics to infer that an injury is work-related and there-
fore compensable. Under the burden-shifting framework presented in 
this Note, judges can make use of such inferences for the benefit of both 
employees and employers, achieving results that more closely adhere to 
the original bargain. Although workers' compensation statutes were writ-
119. See Exceptions, supra note 116, at 1657 ("Courts interpreting and applying 
workers' compensation statutes can accomplish part of this adjustment by applying the 
exclusive remedy rule more selectively and not merely assuming that tort remedies are 
precluded."). 
120. In response to potential tort liability, business lobbyists in some states have 
prodded legislatures to cover CTDs nominally, keeping the claims outside of the tort 
system, but making it difficult to recover in workers' compensation with higher burdens of 
proof. See Burton & Spieler, supra note 40, at 221 (discussing the Virginia legislature's 
amendment to the workers' compensation statute to provide "nominal, but very narrow" 
coverage for CTDs). 
121. See Larson & Larson, supra note 88, § 100-25 (noting that "[b]efore 
occupational diseases were specifically made compensable, and in jurisdictions where they 
are still noncompensable," courts have usually held that employees could sue at common 
law). An Ohio court used similar reasoning in a case involving psychological injuries: 
If a psychological injury is not an injury according to the statutory definition of 
'injury,' then it is not among the class of injuries from which employers are 
immune from suit. Any other interpretation is nonsensical .... The lower court 
decisions remove psychological injuries from the trade-off between employers 
and employees-employees relinquish their common-law remedies for 
psychological injuries in return for nothing. That is antithetical to the 
philosophical underpinnings of the system. 
Bunger v. Lawson Co., 696 N.E.2d 1029, 1031-32 (Ohio 1998). 
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ten in the early part of the twentieth century, their application and inter-
pretation must be adapted to modern-day understandings of science, 
medicine, and the workplace. Judicial reliance on the principles of ergo-
nomics to inform the laws of workers' compensation would be an impor-
tant step towards achieving that goal. 
